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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this Essay is to suggest frameworks and 
modes of inquiry for applying feminist legal analysis to busi-
ness law and the related theory of law and economics. It does 
so in two ways. One is to assess works already written by fem-
inist scholars in the business law arena, highlighting how those 
contributions have begun to pave the way towards enriching 
the scope of business law analysis. The other is to offer two 
new roles for feminist jurisprudence. One role is to define just 
(that is, fair) distributions of rights and the other role is to 
define social judgments of value, both within the context of 
law and economics' efficiency criteria for efficient allocation 
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and cost benefit analyses. As a result, this Essay demonstrates 
that feminist jurisprudence can find fruitful roles consistent 
with its moral goals through interaction with law and econom-
ics, particularly with regard to analyzing business law issues. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
[F]eminist methods are not only useful means to reach femi-
nist goals, but also fundamental ends in themselves. 
Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. 
REV. 829, 832 (1990). 
Feminist legal theory is usually viewed as a methodology 
designed to discern discrimination against disenfranchised 
groups, particularly women, and to demonstrate the unequal dis-
tributions of power and the barriers that exist against more equi-
table distributions. The focus is on the disenfranchised. A 
feminist is considered to be someone concerned about women's 
issues. Analyses extend to how women are harmed: harmed in 
the market place through discriminatory wages and job opportu-
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nities, harmed in the place of employment through sexual harass-
ment, harmed in the privacy of their own homes through 
domestic violence, and harmed in their economic rights through 
their treatment during divorce. The focus of feminist legal the-
ory is on the consequences of sexism in its broadest definition. 
In the efforts to demonstrate issues of women's concern and 
to promote greater understanding and appreciation of their com-
plexities, feminist scholars have evolved techniques of analyses 
that are different from those used in more traditional legal schol-
arship. These techniques, however, prove not only to be very in-
sightful for the problems that they were designed to address but 
are also powerful techniques unto themselves. One might ask 
whether these techniques of analyses can reach beyond the wo-
men's issues that spawned them to contribute significantly to so-
cial and political thinking in general. If so, feminist legal 
methods may serve wider applications in addition to the impor-
tant contributions they have already made in understanding and 
. characterizing gender disenfranchisement. 
The study and development of feminist analysis is relatively 
new. It is particularly new in contrast to one of the oldest (and 
considered masculine) professions around - the study of busi-
ness and its underpinnings, the theory of economics. Thus, 
whether the techniques of feminist analysis would have some-
thing unique to contribute to the understanding of economics in 
law (i.e., the jurisprudence of "law and economics") and the dis-
cipline of business law in the legal context is an intriguing ques-
tion. In general, just as "law and economics" (in its full range of 
political expression from liberal to conservative) has extended 
over time to issues beyond the traditional ones of the business 
market place,l one might wonder if the feminist legal method 
also can be applied to a variety of subjects apart from what is 
now considered traditional concerns of gender.2 
1. See, for example, Webster v. City of Houston, 689 F.2d 1220 (5th Cir. 1982) 
affd on reh'g, 739 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1984), in which Judge Goldberg, in a concur-
rence, applies a law and economics analysis to justify punitive damages to deter 
police violations of civil rights and Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 
1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 816 (1986), in which Judge Posner denied prisoners' 42 
U.S.c. § 1983 action for injuries sustained while in custody on the grounds that the 
prison officials failed to satisfy a law and economics definition of reckless behavior. 
2. I realize, of course, that in one sense an application of feminist analysis to 
any area could be always considered of a gendered nature, since at the root of most 
feminist thinking is the notion that the existing social structure is patriarchal. In that 
view, any analytic contributions to nontraditional subjects would be ferreting out 
and addressing problematic aspects that perhaps would be by definition considered 
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The purpose of this Essay is to suggest frameworks and 
modes of inquiry for applying feminist legal analysis to business 
law and the related theory of law and economics. In particular, 
this Essay offers two new roles for feminist jurisprudence. One is 
to define just (i.e., fair) distributions of rights and the other is to 
define social judgments of value, both within the context of law 
and economic efficiency criteria. The first concern, just rights 
distributions, merges with law and economics' analysis of effi-
cient allocations and distributions of economic rights. The sec-
ond concern, social judgments of value, merges with law and 
economics' cost-benefit analysis of efficiency. In both instances, 
this Essay demonstrates that feminist jurisprudence has the ca-
pacity to resolve particularly controversial aspects arising from 
law and economics' assessment of business law issues. 
In the course of discussion, this Essay assesses works already 
written by feminist scholars in the business law arena, highlight-
ing how those contributions have begun to pave ~he way towards 
enriching the scope of business law analysis. It is not typical in 
law, as it is in other disciplines, to engage in an analysis surveying 
the articles of other scholars to gain insight into an emerging 
field. 3 More often one sees an analysis surveying the opinions of 
several courts or the judicial opinion of one court. Other disci-
plines find reviewing and assessing scholarly efforts in a new area 
an extremely useful enterprise.4 Not only is it possible to extract 
common themes from disparate insights, but such endeavors can 
recognize, suggest, and lay the foundation for new directions im-
patriarchal in nature. I choose here, however, not to label legal areas not normally 
associated with women's concerns as subjects of gender. This Essay shows that femi-
nist analysis can extend indeed beyond patriarchal concerns. Alternatively, for a 
statement characterizing feminist theory as being - at its core - about women, see 
Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REV. 617, 619 (1990): 
Although [feminist critical theories] differ widely in other respects, 
these theories share three central commitments. On a political level, 
they seek to promote equality between women and men. On a sub-
stantive level, feminist critical frameworks make gender a focus of 
analysis; their aim is to reconstitute legal practices that have excluded, 
devalued, or undermined women's concerns. On a methodological 
level, these frameworks aspire to describe the world in ways that cor-
respond to women's experience and that identify the fundamental so-
cial transformations necessary for full equality between the sexes. 
3. More commonly one sees an essay examining the work of one scholar or 
even more typically, a review of one book by an author. 
4. In economics, for example, a whole journal, The Journal of Economic Liter-
ature, is dedicated to this enterprise. To be invited to make a contribution is consid-
ered a mark of distinction and often the survey's analytic contributions causes the 
article to become one of the seminal pieces in the field. 
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portant for future scholarship to explore. Given the increased 
number of new jurisprudences that examine legal issues from en-
tirely different perspectives (e.g., critical race theory, feminist ju-
risprudence, law and economics, communitarianism, and 
post-modernism), analytic surveys of those efforts at various 
stages of development ought to prove useful, as case analysis al-
ready is, to the legal community. 
The goal of this Essay on feminist jurisprudence as applied 
to business law is to serve just such a function. This Essay ob-
serves the challenges other authors address, demonstrates the in-
sights they have in common, and suggests new directions while 
laying the intellectual foundations for future consideration. In 
particular, this Essay demonstrates that feminist jurisprudence 
can find a fruitful role consistent with its moral goals through 
interaction with law and economics, particularly with regard to 
analyzing business law issues. When one recalls that feminist 
theory on the one hand, and business law and law and economics 
on the other, typically are viewed as diametrically opposed to 
one another, particularly politically, then it is not surprising that 
bringing together these disciplines in a synergistic way not only 
suggests difficult obstacles to surmount, but also offers the poten-
tial for innovative and constructive possibilities as well. 
Section II of this Essay introduces the reader to some of the 
foundations of feminist thought. Section A distinguishes three 
major schools of feminist thinking and Section B outlines ana-
lytic tools developed in feminist analysis originally for the pur-
pose of addressing women's concerns. Those tools now prove to 
be useful in analyzing business law problems. Section III ana-
lyzes the first efforts of feminist scholars to apply their frame-
work to business law concerns, and to define a general theory of 
feminine jurisprudence in business law and in law and economics. 
Section IV discusses in some detail a published interchange be-
tween a feminist scholar and a law and economics scholar evalu-
ating the emerging market economy in China. This interchange 
serves as the springboard for this Essay's first contribution of a 
new role for feminist thought. That role is feminist jurispru-
dence's capacity to define justice in rights distributions in a law 
and economics efficiency context. 
Section V explores the first two articles to apply feminist 
analysis to specific business law issues. In that context, Section 
VI suggests a second significant role for feminist jurisprudence in 
business law analysis and that is to define social values for the 
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purpose of law and economics efficient cost benefit analysis. 
Through the discussions in Sections IV and VI, this Essay shows 
that feminist analysis has the capacity to address issues that are 
far removed from women's concerns and thus offers broader 
prospects then previously thought. This Essay then closes with a 
conclusion in Section VII and is followed in Section VIII with a 
bibliography of the articles applying feminist analysis to business 
law available at the time of this Essay's publication. Also in-
cluded in the bibliography are some articles on feminist jurispru-
dence in general that a reader new to the subject might find 
useful. 
Feminist thought, with its richness and varied perspectives, 
has had a significant effect on the way we think and talk about a 
number of gender-related issues such as reproductive freedom, 
sexual harassment, domestic violence, and equality of access to 
social and economic independence. The introduction of feminist 
legal methods to areas not specifically focused on women's ques-
tions should also prove to be insightful since new tools will ad-
dress long-standing topics in novel and interesting ways. 
II. FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: AN INTRODUCTION 
A. Schools of Thought 
As generally held by most scholars in the field,S the three 
most widely recognized schools of feminist jurisprudential 
thought are the liberal feminists, the cultural (or relational) femi-
nists, and the radical feminists, though other perspectives exist as 
wel1.6 The liberal feminists are typically characterized as calling 
for the equal treatment of women and men. They argue against 
using women's differences as a basis for discriminating against 
women. For example, they would argue against corporations be-
ing allowed to use the fact that women have children and tend to 
5. It is impossible in the context of this Essay to describe feminist jurispru-
dence fully. Better discussions can be found in other essays and articles, some of 
which are listed in the bibliography in Section VIII of this Essay. What are 
presented here are some introductory aspects of feminist jurisprudence helpful in 
understanding the recent developments in business law. Much of what follows in 
this section is drawn from Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. 
L. REV. 829 (1990), Rhode, supra note 2, and Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gen-
der, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988). 
6. The post modem school of feminist thought is one such example. See gener-
ally Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REV. 803 
(1990). 
1999] FEMINISM AND THE LAW OF BUSINESS 45 
be the primary caretaker at home as a basis for not hiring them in 
important positions. 
The cultural (or relational) feminists are usually thought of 
as those who wish to celebrate the differences of women and ac-
knowledge that those differences bring something positive rather 
than something negative to the community. In the business con-
text, this means that women can deal with the same jobs, issues, 
roles, and creative expressions as men, but women may approach 
the tasks differently and in a manner that enhances society. 
Another approach to acknowledging and celebrating the dif-
ferences of women combines the celebratory perspective with a 
perspective that views the prevailing social structure as embody-
ing a system of subordination. This approach views the issue of 
gender politics as one of both power inequality and conflicting 
values, in which the conflict in values is a conflict between a femi-
nist ethic of care and a "masculinist"7 patriarchal ethic of domi-
nance. According to this feminist perspective, the masculinist 
value professes to support individual autonomy by basing social 
and political decisions on an "objective" evaluation of individual 
rights, the goal of which is to promote individual freedom cir-
cumscribed only to protect one individual from annihilation by 
the actions of another.8 But a feminist evaluation sees the mas-
culinist approach as in fact alienating, isolating, and depersonal-
izing the individual. This patriarchal vision that purports to 
promote equality for all is, at its core, hierarchical in orientation 
and focuses on the depowerment of individuals through debilitat-
ing their access to knowledge and shared cooperative enterprise.9 
In contrast, the feminist value is concerned with needs, nur-
turing, and connection with others, often referred to as the ethic 
7. I first encountered the term "masculinist" in Catharine MacKinnon's discus-
sion contained in Lecture, Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law - A Con-
versation, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 11 (1985). It is used here as one of the many variations 
of terms used in feminist literature to characterize what is frequently referred to as 
the dominant "male" perspective. See generally West, supra note 5, at 58-70. "Mas-
culinist" is appealing because, in its symmetry to the word "feminist," it reminds us 
that the social mode viewed as mainstream is in fact a perspective on social order of 
a particular group - that is, men. Though the perspective is considered main-
stream, it is not universal. 
8. See West, supra note 5, at 5-11. 
9. See Kathleen A. Lahey & Sarah W. Salter, Corporate Law in Legal Theory 
and Legal Scholarship: From Classicism to Feminism, 23 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 543, 
554 (1985) (citing KATHLEEN FERGUSON, THE FEMINIST CASE AGAINST BUREAU-
CRACY (1984». 
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of care and connectedness.lO It seeks what it believes is true 
equality, one which acknowledges differences among individuals, 
offers solutions to problems through collaboration of all con-
cerned, and promotes values that envision the needs of the com-
munity as a whole and not values focused solely on creating 
isolated spheres of individual autonomy. Since the masculinist 
view is inherently hierarchical in nature, changes within the sys-
tem to redress any particular ills towards women will only be 
patchwork in nature. Since the heart of the system is patriarchal, 
its engine will inevitably grind towards continued oppression that 
will merely be expressed in other ways. The only remedy for this 
is to replace the core masculinist values with those of the femi-
nists. In other words, to "include" the female voice requires a 
systemic change at the core of values, not an issue by issue band-
aid approach. 
Many feminists who support this view classify themselves as 
cultural or relational feminists. Reflecting the diversity among 
feminist thinkers, some who adopt this view classify themselves 
as radical feminists. Some do not classify themselves at all. 
Other feminists who often are considered radical feminists 
take a much stronger approach than that stated above. Their 
analysis about the exclusion of women rests primarily on an anal-
ysis of power. For some, the "female" ethic of care and connect-
edness itself is seen as a trap for women. They argue that it is 
women's sense of connectedness that seduces women into caring 
for others and subordinating their own needs. The female ethic 
of care actually sets w\omen up to be oppressed: oppressed in 
their bodies through the rigors of childbearing and invasive sex, 
in their minds through limitations on their intellectual endeavors, 
in their emotions which are discounted as irrelevant, and in their 
relationships, in which they are always subordinate to men. 
These relational aspects need to be limited so that women can 
develop their own autonomy. The only way a woman can be free 
of this oppression is to become autonomous, independent, and in 
complete control over her own life, physically, spiritually, and 
morally. Some radical feminists take the position that this re-
quires a complete separation from men. Others view that any 
contact with men is automatically oppressive. The strategy then 
10. See West, supra note 5. 
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is separation and not collaboration, and the focus is on the re-
moval of patriarchal values in order to liberate women.11 
All of the above feminist approaches are gendered analyses. 
That is, though the conclusions of each school differ, each of the 
analyses are based on the differences that gender creates, 
whether it is with respect to the treatment of women or with re-
spect to the values social institutions incorporate. 
One question that is natural to raise when examining the po-
tential for a feminist jurisprudential analysis of business law is 
whether a gendered analysis can provide useful insights in the 
business law forum when the focus is not specifically about wo-
men's issues but on issues concerning disenfranchised groups in 
general.12 
A second, broader question to raise but perhaps more diffi-
cult to answer is whether feminist analysis can encompass more 
than a gendered approach. That is, do the tools and techniques 
of feminist legal theory still yield insights if they are applied in a 
nongendered context and beyond issues of group disenfran-
chisement?13 
As will be seen in the articles discussed below, the authors to 
varying degrees answer the above questions either directly or in-
directly when addressing business law issues. It may take, how-
ever, considerably more experience with applying feminist 
analysis to specific business law problems before a general role 
can be abstracted for feminist jurisprudence in that forum. 
B. Analytical Approaches 
Over time, feminist writers have developed certain concepts 
and tools to use when engaging in feminist analysis. Though they 
designed these tools to render unambiguously clear the disen-
franchisement of women in the prevailing social order, the writ-
ers discussed in this Essay have. applied these same concepts and 
11. See id. at 28-29. 
12. Martha Minow has already demonstrated the use of feminist analysis in un-
derstanding the concerns of other disenfranchised groups based on characteristics 
such as race, ethnicity, and age. See Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term 
- Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10,57-95 (1987). 
13. See David Cole, Getting There: Reflections on Trashing From Feminist Juris-
prudence and Critical Theory, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 59, 79 n.82 (1985) (explaining 
that analysis of feminists is from the perspective of a marginalized group, and affords 
them the advantage of valuable insights). 
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tools to the business law issues they address. A brief discussion 
of these concepts and tools here is therefore useful.14 
The feminist ethic of care is probably the single most impor-
tant paradigm used in feminist reasoning. Almost all other tools 
and approaches have this principle as their underlying premise. 
The feminist ethic of care serves to contrast with what feminists 
view as the masculine ethic of autonomy.15 Feminist analysis 
concludes that the masculine ethic of autonomy in fact leads to 
domination and subordination of individuals in a hierarchical 
structure that is indifferent to individual needs. This hierarchical 
structure is often referred to as a patriarchal structure.16 The 
feminist ethic of care holds that concern for others is of para-
mount importance. In a macro sense, the needs of all members 
of the community are equally important and decisions should be 
made based on those collective considerations. On a micro level, 
one's individual actions should be guided by their impact on 
others. 
Separation or dichotomies are concepts used specifically in 
feminist reasoning to characterize the destructive compart-
mentalization of various aspects of individuals' lives that they ex-
perience when living in a patriarchal society. For example, 
feminists often discuss the imposed separation of the public and 
private spheres in which the individual's work life is isolated 
from his or her personal life and vice versa.17 As a result, one's 
personal (and family) needs are not permitted to be considered 
in one's working environment, which sometimes can lead to 
crushing experiences. Reintegrating18 separate spheres or dichot-
omies is a position feminists often advocate. The feminist ethic 
14. For a good foundation in feminist concepts and reasoning, see generally 
Bartlett, supra note 5, Rhode, supra note 2, and West, supra note 5. 
15. See Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 
YALE L.J. 1373, 1385 (1986). 
16. See Martha L. Fineman, Challenging Law, Establishing Differences: The Fu-
ture of Feminist Legal Scholarship, 42 FLA. L. REV. 25, 40 (1990); see also Patricia 
Smith, Introduction: Feminist Jurisprudence and the Nature of Law, in FEMINIST Ju-
RISPRUDENCE 3, 3-4 (Patricia Smith ed., 1995). 
17. "The essence of this [patriarchal] ideology was that the world was naturally 
divided into two parts, or spheres: one, a public sphere, of work and politics, inhab-
ited by men; and the second, a personal or domestic sphere, encompassing home and 
family life, which was deemed the realm of women." Diane Polan, Toward a Theory 
of Law and Patriarchy, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 294, 
298 (David Kairys ed., 1982). 
18. See Kathleen A. Lahey, " ... Until Women Themselves Have Told All that 
They Have to Tell . .. ," 23 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 519, 533 (1985). 
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of care asserts that the work place must take into consideration 
its workers' personal needs. 
The excluded voice, the voice of the other, or the "other," 
reflects feminists' realization that, historically, the woman's per-
spective of her own experience had been completely excluded 
from legal, social, or other political considerations, even in those 
circumstances in which women were harmed. Effectively, legal 
evaluations and policy decisions were based on the man's subjec-
tive experience and concerns. Fairness and justice were defined 
in terms of what seemed fair to him. If a woman's subjective 
experience deviated from the man's, the woman's perspective did 
not enter into the analysis. Thus, the man's subjective experience 
became the "objective" one and the woman's experience was rel-
egated to a "no-man's" land, unseen, unheard and unconsidered. 
Thus, the woman became the "other," that is the "other" to the 
centrality of man. And as the "other," the woman and her 
"voice" (i.e., her perspective) were excluded from any considera-
tion. Hence, the feminists concluded that the woman's voice was 
the "excluded voice."19 
For example, for a long time the crime of rape was tried in 
court by examining the woman's behavior or conduct to see if the 
man's forced penetration of her was justified from the man's sub-
jective experience. Often the conclusion was that the man's con-
duct was justified because (from his perspective) she was "asking 
for it." Whether this was indeed her intent or whether she even 
construed her conduct to convey this was rarely, if ever, consid-
ered. Her "voice" was completely excluded from the legal analy-
sis. The weight of whatever resistance the woman might have 
offered paled in comparison to the weight given to the man's per-
ception of the surrounding circumstances. ("What part of 'no' do 
you not understand?" was not a question posed before feminist 
consciousness was raised.)2° Similar analysis extended to the 
treatment of domestic violence in the home and sexual harass-
ment in the work place. Recognizing and "hearing" the excluded 
voice, the voice of the "other" is a major contribution of feminist 
thinking. 
19. "To keep its operation fair in appearance ... the law strives for rules that 
are universal, objective, and neutral. ... [T]he law [must] comprehend that women's 
definitions have been excluded and marginalized, and to show that the language of 
neutrality itself is one of the devices for this silencing." Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking 
Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 
64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 886, 896 (1989). 
20. See, e.g., Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087 (1986). 
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In order to facilitate hearing and understanding the ex-
cluded voice, feminists developed the techniques of narrative and 
context analysis. Narrative is a technique in which the excluded 
voice, typically the woman's, tells her story. We learn then what 
the subjective experience is,21 and in our concern for the 
"other"22 which is motivated by the ethic of care, we can deter-
mine what the individual's needs are and how we can address 
them. The narrative technique is now used in various arenas of 
legal discourse.23 
Context analysis recognizes that the prevailing social para-
digm may not be meaningful for those individuals whose voices 
are excluded. The analysis of their circumstances only makes 
sense in the context in which the events occur.24 For example, 
the requirement that an individual can only use force equal to 
the threat posed to protect oneself from an attacker is meaning-
less when a petite woman faces a muscular male who intends to 
rape her through his own physical strength. Since he is using 
nondeadly force, she is limited to nondeadly force. But clearly 
her capacity to defend herself through her physical prowess is in 
itself quite futile. A knife or gun may be the only means by 
which she can protect herself effectively, yet this would legally 
constitute the use of deadly force. An understanding of her mo-
tives and dilemma, whether or not one concurs with the validity 
of the action itself, can only be reached by examining the circum-
stances in context,25 Feminists have used context analysis to illu-
minate a number of scenarios that appear to be applications of 
21. "Through consciousness raising [narrative], women grasp the collective real-
ity of women's condition from within the perspective of that experience, not from 
outside it." Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: 
An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS 515, 536 (1982). 
22. "The female voice is associated with a self connected to others, intimacy, 
care, and responsiveness to relationship." Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia Redux: 
Another Look at Gender, Feminism, and Legal Ethics, 2 VA. J. Soc. POL'y & L. 75, 
80 (1994). 
23. Note its current use in the hearings held by the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission in South Africa. See, e.g., Nelson Mandela, Reconciliation Still the Task 
For All South Africans, Hous. CHRON., June 16, 1999, at 27. See also Thabo Mbeki, 
Haunted by History: Race and National Reconciliation in South Africa, HARV. INT'L 
REV., Summer 1999, at 96, 95; Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela, White People Just Don't 
Get It About Racism, L.A. TIMES, JULY 12, 1999, at B5 ("America could learn a 
lesson from South Africa about the healing power of confronting its ugly past."). 
24. "[I]ndividualized factfinding is often superior to the application of bright-
line rules[:] ... reasoning from context allows a greater respect for difference and for 
the perspectives of the powerless." Bartlett, supra note 5, at 849. 
25. See Christine R. Essique, Note, The Use of Deadly Force by Women Against 
Rape in Michigan: Justifiable Homicide?, 37 WAYNE L. REV. 1969, 1978-86 (1991). 
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equal justice in the abstract, but prove not to be just at all when 
placed in the context of a woman's subjective experience. 
Though other tools and concepts exist in feminist analysis, 
the ones mentioned here are the primary ones encountered in 
the feminist literature on business law discussed below. 
III. TACKLING BUSINESS LAW 
Feminist theory generates challenging new perspectives for 
analysis of legal phenomena generally, even in the unlikely 
area of corporate law.26 
A. Introduction 
This section presents first those articles that examine the im-
pact feminist jurisprudence can have in the development of busi-
ness law reasoning. As might be expected, the feminist analysis 
found here primarily levels significant criticism at the prevailing 
allocations of power in business law and policy structure. Extra-
polating from these criticisms however, one can discern a more 
powerful, broader role for feminist scholarship that is not readily 
anticipated. That role is to affect business law's and law and eco-
nomics' deliberation of the socially optimal allocation of prop-
erty and other economic rights. Feminist analysis can serve to 
define social justice within the context of economic efficiency. 
As demonstrated below, economic efficiency does not define a 
unique optimal economic state; it in fact only defines a range of 
choices. Feminist jurisprudence can serve to determine which of 
those choices are socially just. 
This section of the Essay then continues with an analysis of 
the first two articles to apply feminist principles to resolve spe-
cific business law problems. As a result of this examination, an-
other avenue for the development of feminist jurisprudence in 
business law reveals itself. Feminist analysis can affirmatively ad-
dress the question of what levels of socially risky enterprise con-
duct society wishes to tolerate in exchange for economic 
advancement. This question is usually considered solely within 
the purview of law and economics which, through the application 
of cost-benefit analysis to business situations, often reaches con-
clusions some find unsettling and unhappy. Feminist theory can 
here redefine ambiguous cost-benefit parameters more in accord-
ance with social notions of justice and fairness. 
26. Lahey & Salter, supra note 9, at 569. 
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Readers may well know the significant role that law and eco-
nomics has played in understanding questions of allocations of 
economic rights and judicious levels of enterprise risk. Though 
surprising, this Essay demonstrates a synergistic effect of combin-
ing two disparate and seemingly antithetical disciplines, feminist 
jurisprudence and law and economics, to resolve more satisfacto-
rily business law issues. As a result, feminist analysis proves its 
capacity to uncover and illuminate conundrums not addressed or 
adequately unraveled in areas unconcerned with gendered issues. 
B. The First 
Kathleen A. Lahey and Sarah W. Salter's article Corporate 
Law in Legal Theory and Legal Scholarship: From Classicism to 
Feminism 27 is one of the first to recognize that feminist analysis 
could be used constructively in an area that was not normally 
thought of as a woman's issue. The article also serves as an inter-
esting foundation for a discussion about the ways in which femi-
nist theory might be used to address concerns about corporate 
conduct.28 
Reviewing the literature they consider relevant to a feminist 
analysis of corporate law, Lahey and Salter portray a progression 
of feminist consciousness about the corporate world. It begins 
with a liberal approach emphasizing the goals of equal treatment 
and success for women comparable to that enjoyed by men in the 
business environment. Addressing first the "survival" manuals 
(i.e., guides for women on how to succeed in the corporate 
world), Lahey and Salter show that even in the context of seek-
ing equal treatment for women in the work place, the scholarly 
development in that arena inevitably turned to a critique of the 
work place itself and its negative effects on the individua1.29 
What the authors observe about analyses of gender concerns in 
the business world parallels the development of feminist thought 
itself as it moved from the liberal goals of equal treatment for 
women to a general critique of our social structure that emerged 
in both radical and what subsequently came to be called cultural 
or relational feminism. 3D 
27. Lahey & Salter, supra note 9. 
28. As this is a Canadian piece, their emphasis is on Canadian literature but 
their analysis would probably hold as well for U.S. scholarship. 
29. See Lahey & Salter, supra note 9, at 544-45. 
30. See generally Bartlett, supra note 5; West, supra note 5. 
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Arguing in favor of continuing the progression of critical 
analysis of the working environment, Lahey and Salter set forth 
an agenda for feminist thinking about corporate law. Publishing 
in 1985, midst a prolific and prodigious period of feminist juris-
prudential thought in general, the authors distinguish three femi-
nist schools: liberal, socialist, and radical. They characterize the 
liberal school, as others since have, as one that emphasizes strate-
gies to overcome barriers to equal workplace treatment for wo-
men. The socialist perspective discerns and critiques the 
corporate culture itself for its appropriation of the individual's 
sense of self and the corporate demands on the individual to 
subordinate his or her individual and familial interests in favor of 
corporate needs. The authors feel, however, that it is left to the 
radical feminist perspective to pick up the gauntlet of corporate 
law analysis because this perspective is the only approach with 
the capacity to address what they consider to be the core issues.31 
The radical perspective requires us to examine how the cur-
rent corporate structure is supported by the legal system that 
generates it and what ethical and moral values drive that legal 
system. Lahey and Salter view the legal system as embodying the 
dominant ethic of patriarchy that drives the system's social ills. 
Feminist theory is especially adept at recognizing those ills and 
understanding patriarchal dominance and only radical feminism 
will explore the implications of that ethic fully.32 
Applying radical feminist analysis, the authors observe that 
there are two dimensions of corporate structure that render it 
problematic: its structural mode and its ethics, both of which are 
driven by "masculist"33 patriarchal values. The corporate struc-
ture mode is one of centralized hierarchy. This creates an atmos-
phere of isolation, depersonalization, and separation among the 
individuals connected with the firm. By limiting an individual's 
access to information, the corporate structure disempowers indi-
viduals at all levels of the hierarchy, manifesting dominance over 
them. Such an atmosphere not only discourages cooperative ef-
forts to the benefit of all, but also fosters among other ills ethnic 
and gender discrimination. 
Lahey and Salter argue, however, that changing these corpo-
rate behaviors is not enough since many corporations have al-
31. See Lahey & Salter, supra note 9, at 544-57. 
32. See id. at 555. 
33. [d. at 543. Lahey and Salter prefer the term "masculist" as opposed to 
"masculinist" used by other feminist authors. 
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ready adopted alternative forms of organization - job rotation, 
ethnic and gender diversity, and group cooperation. Yet we ob-
serve that they still retain their "essential character." What La-
hey and Salter charge is that the core of the corporation - its 
moral value - has to change as well. The ethics of the corpora-
tion must replace the masculist values of separation, abstract 
rules, rights, and entitlements with the feminist ethic of care, con-
nectedness, and responsibility.34 
Thus, the role of feminist theory in general - and radical 
feminist analysis in particular - is not to address solely women's 
concerns in business law. Feminist theory instead can reach for 
more fundamental solutions, being uniquely capable of providing 
a systemic critique of the business law structure as it affects soci-
ety. In particular, it can assess what the ethical core of corporate 
law is and what it ought to be in order to enhance the welfare of 
all members of the community as a whole.35 
Lahey and Salter wrote during a period in which the growth 
of feminist insight was rapid. The division of feminist thought 
into distinct perspectives was still in process. Today, as those 
classifications are more distinct, adherents to the different per-
spectives often see their view as not only preferable to others but 
also adverse to them. In retrospect, one can look back at what 
the authors describe as the behavioral manifestations of corpo-
rate culture, the hierarchical structure, as an analysis of the role 
of dominance that came to be the focal point of what is now clas-
sified as radical feminism. The authors' assertion of the need to 
change the ethical core to the ethic of care, however, is an analy-
sis that is currently identified with cultural or relational feminists. 
In fact, the authors cite directly to the works of Carol Gilligan 
and Nancy Chodorow as their sources for the feminist ethic of 
care - two authors who are now distinctly identified as cultural 
feminists.36 Thus, though Lahey and Salter identified themselves 
as radical feminists, their analysis in fact contains the salient ele-
ments of what are now considered two distinct schools of 
thought. 
More recently, those who identify themselves as radical fem-
inists focus almost exclusively on the issues of dominance and 
changing or at least modifying the behavior that that attitude 
34. See id. at 548-49. 
35. See id. at 555, 569-72. 
36. See id. at 556. 
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brings.37 Some radicals actually reject the relational aspects of 
the feminist ethic of care because they see it as a trap.38 Cultural 
feminists on the other hand, though they acknowledge the impor-
tance of addressing dominance, emphasize the importance of the 
ethic of care. They advocate persuading the mainstream that the 
ethic of care is a better ethic and makes for a better 
community.39 
An implication of Lahey and Salter's work is that at the very 
least we should adopt the feminist goals of both today's radicals 
and culturalists, that is, to end dominance behavior and substi-
tute the ethics of care for society's morality. There is even the 
suggestion that culturalists' goals are more essential. Modifica-
tion of dominant behavior will only be patchwork; only if the 
moral core is changed will there be a fundamental change.4o As 
self-identified radical feminists in 1985, Lahey and Salter posit 
the importance of substituting alternative values as well as end-
ing dominance behavior. One wonders if the synergistic force of 
feminist analysis has suffered as feminist thought refined into the 
separate and distinct schools of radical and cultural feminists. 
Lahey and Salter argue that feminism can inform corporate 
law (and, by extension, business law) analysis in a powerful way. 
They suggest that a feminist approach can do more than look at 
issues of gender and discrimination; feminist thinking can pro-
vide the framework by which business law itself can be revamped 
for the benefit of all.41 Feminist analysis cannot only uncover 
inherent problems, but it can also provide the medium and basis 
for remedying those ills of business culture that cause society and 
all its members to suffer. 
C. Dormancy 
One might expect, given the clarity of groundwork that La-
hey and Salter laid out with respect to corporate law in particular 
and the fertility of ideas in feminist jurisprudence in general, that 
others would have picked up the gauntlet readily to further ad-
dress business law issues. There have been, however, at the time 
37. See, e.g., ANDREA DWORKIN & CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, PORNOGRA. 
PHY AND CiVIL RIGHTS (1988); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
OF WORKING WOMEN (1979); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, 
and Speech, 20 HARV. c.R.-c.L. L. REV. 1 (1985). 
38. See supra text accompanying note 5. 
39. See West, supra note 5, at 65-66. 
40. See Lahey & Salter, supra note 9, at 555. 
41. See id. at 569. 
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of this Essay, only two more articles on the role that feminist 
analysis can play in business law generally and their publication 
did not occur until nearly ten years later in 1994: Ramona 
Paetzold, Commentary: Feminism and Business Law: The Essen-
tiaL Interconnection, 31 AM. Bus. L.J. 699 (1994), and Ronnie Co-
hen, Feminist Thought and Corporate Law: It's Time to Find Our 
Way Up From the Bottom (Line), 2 Am. D.J. GENDER & L. 1 
(1994).42 Three other articles, also recently written, take a femi-
nist perspective on law and economic analyses of the economy as 
a whole: Jeanne M. Dennis, The Lessons of ComparabLe Worth: 
A Feminist Vision of Law and Economic Theory, 4 DCLA Wo-
MEN'S L.J. 1 (1993), Sharon Hom and Robin Paul Malloy, 
China's Market Economy: A Semiosis of Cross Boundary Dis-
course Between Law and Economics and Feminist Jurisprudence, 
45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 815 (1994), and Shelley Wright, Women 
and the GLobaL Economic Order: A Feminist Perspective, 10 AM. 
D. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 861 (1995). These three are of interest 
even though they are not about business law specifically. In-
stead, they analyze the environment in which business law oper-
ates - the economy - and they do so by evaluating law and 
economic approaches to the economy, a perspective that has in-
formed much of the changes in business law analysis over the last 
three decades. Finally, two other articles, published just prior to 
the ones mentioned above, apply feminist principles to tackle 
two specific, decidedly business law questions: The first, Leslie 
Bender's Feminist (Re)Torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, 
Mass Torts, Power and Responsibility (1990 DUKE L.J. 848), ad-
dresses the mass torts crises, and the second, Theresa Gabaldon's 
The Lemonade Stand: Feminist and Other Reflections on the Lim-
ited Liability of Corporate SharehoLders (45 V AND. L. REV. 1387 
(1992), questions the role of limited liability in American enter-
prise and suggesting modifications. These seven articles, two that 
discuss a general theory of a feminist approach to business law, 
three that discuss an evaluation of the business law environment, 
and two that discuss specific business law problems are the ones 
42. This is not to suggest that other scholars have not taken a feminist approach 
to business law before then. For notable exceptions, see Theresa Gabaldon, The 
Lemonade Stand: Feminist and Other Reflections on the Limited Liability of Corpo-
rate Shareholders, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1387 (1992), and Leslie Bender, Feminist 
Re(Torts): Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts, Power, and Responsibilities, 
1990 DUKE L.J. 848 (1990). These articles (discussed below), however, address the 
very specific issue of corporate liability for harm and do not engage in a discussion 
of the role of feminist jurisprudence in business law in general. 
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to be discussed here. They are useful to examine for the insights 
they provide as to the role feminist analysis can play in business 
law issues.43 
One might ask why there is such a paucity of feminist analy-
sis of business structure, particularly since feminists (among 
others) have long noted that the seat of power of our society re-
sides in the business environment. The business environment 
provides the engine that drives and supports the role of domina-
tion in our system. 
An almost too easy explanation is that the concerns of femi-
nist legal scholars have focused on those issues about which gen-
der bias has the most immediate negative impact on women: 
rape, domestic violence, and impoverishment due to marital dis-
solution. Those subjects have taken feminist scholars into areas 
of law far removed from the topics of business. 
Feminist legal scholarship has for some time, however, ex-
tended beyond the parameters of physical and sexual assault and 
the financial havoc created by the break-up of the traditional nu-
clear family. A more subtle explanation for the lack of a devel-
oping feminist jurisprudence with regard to business law is that 
many aspects of business law that directly affect women have 
been addressed in other legal arenas. Feminist analyses of wage 
and employment discrimination, sexual harassment in the work-
place, and even child-care issues all reflect on the business envi-
ronment. But each of these topics tends to be analyzed from the 
perspective of civil rights, labor law, and family law. Though 
more theoretical feminist analyses of social structure and systems 
often have their genesis in specific gender questions, if the legal 
framework examined is other than business law per se, the theory 
will extend itself to that other subject area.44 
A more disturbing explanation for the lack of feminist schol-
arship may be the gender discrimination that women have suf-
fered in the business law fields themselves. Until recently, it has 
been difficult for women academics to gain attention and for 
their work to be taken seriously in the traditionally male fields of 
43. Only the most recent of years have seen an increase in the number of other 
business law articles with a feminist slant. Those articles have been included in the 
bibliography in Section VIII of this Essay. 
44. The best example of this is Leslie Bender's work on mass torts. Bender 
addresses the mass tort problem that arises in corporate law. Though she addresses 
remedies within the corporate law framework, her analysis is couched primarily 
within the framework of tort law rather than business law. See Bender, supra note 
42; infra text accompanying notes 111-31. 
58 UCLA WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 10:39 
business. Though the progress for women in legal academia has 
been slow, it has been even slower for women in the business-
oriented fields. Women have been much less likely to be invited 
to present their work at conferences, they have been less likely to 
be appointed to leadership positions in the business-oriented aca-
demic disciplines, and they are less likely to be hired in academic 
positions for business subjects than they are in other legal 
fields. 45 Indeed, academic women who have moved forward into 
business law areas note not only the difficulty in getting their 
work recognized within their areas of discipline, but also the lack 
of support from their sister colleagues whose own work has been 
focused on the more traditional gender issues.46 
Women are most likely to examine what feminist jurispru-
dence offers any particular discipline. If women are discouraged 
from succeeding in business-oriented fields, it probably has had 
the secondary effect of discouraging the development of a femi-
nist analysis of business law.47 Therefore, the recent increase in 
the number of women writing in business law areas probably ex-
plains the very recent increase in the number of articles in the 
area with a feminist perspective.48 Thus, we probably can look 
forward to an increase in the insight that feminist jurisprudence 
45. For example, examining The AALS Directory of Law Teachers over several 
years shows that the number of women teaching Corporations for one to five years 
increased dramatically in recent years. In 1988-89, the number was 61. This in-
creased to 81 in 1991-92, to 95 in 1993-94, and to 103 in 1994-95. 
46. To address this concern, the Section on Women in Legal Education of the 
American Association formed the Committee on Women Faculty in Business Law 
Areas in 1991, and there have been significant strides since then. 
47. One would hope that a suggestion made by Theresa Gabaldon as to why the 
lack of feminist jurisprudence in the area - that business law is so dominated by 
male values "that feminist inquiry simply has no immediate response other than 
generalized invocation of the concept of 'oppression' - would only be true in the 
short run. Gabaldon, supra note 42, at 1415. Certainly, though such a circumstance 
is quite daunting, it is not unique to business law. The domination of male values is 
exactly what feminist scholars have sought to overcome in the areas of rape, domes-
tic violence, and sexual harassment. Though the battles have been hard fought, the 
measure of success has not been small. Gabaldon's own path-breaking article dem-
onstrates that inroads into the (male dominated) field of business can be made, and, 
as Gabaldon ably shows, the contributions of feminist jurisprudence to the area can 
extend beyond observations of oppression. Her other suggestion "that feminists ... 
have realized that addressing a corporate law audience ... would be ... a sublime 
waste of time" indicates the courage it takes to move scholarly inquiry in this direc-
tion. [d. 
48. For a discussion of a similar effect on the corporate world itself with the 
increase of women in the business hierarchy, see Ronnie Cohen, Feminist Thought 
and Corporate Law: It's Time to Find Our Way Up From the Bottom (Line), 2 AM. 
V.I. GENDER & L. 1, 33 (1994). 
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has to offer business law in the future. Towards that end, this 
Essay discusses what some scholars have had to say thus far. 
D. Towards a General Theory 
Ramona Paetzold, in her article, Commentary: Feminism 
and Business Law: The Essential Interconnection,49 suggests that 
"an ultimate test of the feminist impact on law . . . will be 
whether feminist perspectives come to be addressed throughout 
typical 'business law.' "50 She puts forth what she considers the 
essence of feminist theory to critically evaluate business law. She 
stresses the importance of moving beyond specific legal issues of 
women's concern and towards recognizing that all law is 
gendered.51 Feminist theory is an analysis of power and in partic-
ular the power engendered by patriarchy. One significant change 
resulting from the application of feminist analysis, she suggests, 
will be that judges shift from a detached, "objective" approach, 
usually identified with patriarchy, to one that is empathic and 
careful (emphasis mine) of those who are powerless.52 
Her call for feminist thinking and the reasons for its need 
echoes what Lahey and Salter asserted ten years earlier, but 
Paetzold has the advantage of ten more years of development in 
feminist thought in feminist jurisprudence. The analytic themes 
suggested by Lahey and Salter of the mode of dominance and the 
ethic of care have been bolstered by feminist legal methods to 
uncover imbalances of power, excluded voices, and to usher forth 
a concern for the "other." In advocating analysis of power and 
the concern for the "other," Paetzold suggests that business law 
use feminist methods such as context analysis, the narrative form 
and the development of new language. Business law should at 
least adopt the feminist recognition that the traditional language 
may fail in its communication of the experience of the oppressed 
because it embodies the perspective of the oppressor.53 
Paetzold is concerned also about how feminist jurisprudence 
is taught. Organization by areas of interest to women's issues 
such as women and work, women and the family, and women 
and their bodies, may give the impression that feminism is solely 
49. Ramona L. Paetzold, Commentary: Feminism and Business Law: The Essen-
tiaL Interconnection, 31 AM. Bus. L.J. 699 (1993). 
50. /d. at 700-01. 
51. See id. at 704. 
52. See id. at 712-14. 
53. See id. at 714-15. 
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about women's issues when in fact it is a systemic analysis of our 
legal foundations.54 Feminism needs to be approached as a co-
herent theory of all law, and discussions should turn on aspects 
of what feminist jurisprudence implies for remaking law. 55 
Paetzold argues for advancing feminist jurisprudential analy-
sis of business law beyond the specific confines of women's con-
cerns in business. She does, however, still anchor the feminist 
jurisprudence potential along gender lines: "al/law ... is a femi-
nist concern[,] ... our entire legal system is gendered."56 Her 
perspective is certainly understandable because the dominant fo-
cus of feminist jurisprudence has been the patriarchal (read: 
male) values of our legal system. 
This leaves open the question as to whether the analytic 
framework and techniques developed by feminist analysis can 
transcend even the patriarchal/feminist dichotomy it has focused 
on thus far. Such transcendency certainly is not necessary for 
feminist analysis to make a significant contribution to business 
law. Paetzold suggests what feminist analysis can offer business 
law within a gendered framework. Even within Paetzold's own 
discussion of feminist jurisprudence, however, lie the seeds of a 
larger, more global perspective for feminist thought and that is as 
an analysis of power and its allocation. An analysis of power 
does not need to be anchored to an analysis of how patriarchy 
allocates power. An analysis of power should be able to address 
all forms of allocations. Patriarchy is just one form of allocation. 
Thus a new question arises: Does feminism have the power to 
address allocations in general? 
Ronnie Cohen's article, Feminist Thought and Corporate 
Law: It's Time to Find Our Way Up From the Bottom (Line),57 
published in the same year as Paetzold's, focuses more on the 
potential role for the feminist ethic of care in business law. Co-
hen addresses the potential impact of the feminist ethic of care 
on corporate conduct (as Lahey and Salter suggested). Cohen 
first notes that the philosophical perspective underlying current 
54. See id. at 704. 
55. Books published since Paetzold's article in fact take the approach of com-
bining an analysis of specific women's legal issues within an explicit feminist juris-
prudential framework. See KATHARINE T. BARTLETT, GENDER AND THE LAW: 
THEORY, DOCrRINE, COMMENTARY (1993); MARY BECKER ET AL., FEMINIST JURIS-
PRUDENCE: TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY (1994); FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: FOUN-
DATIONS (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1993). 
56. Paetzold, supra note 49, at 704. 
57. Cohen, supra note 48. 
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corporate law parallels quite remarkably the "masculine" liberal 
view of the law pertaining to the individual. 58 Liberal analysis 
sees the individual as self-interested, accumulating for his own 
welfare, and naturally aggressive towards others. The law serves 
to place limits on behavior to the extent necessary to protect in-
dividuals from one another's pursuit of happiness. Cohen ob-
serves that the current view of corporations is analogous: 
corporations are seen as wealth accumulating profit-maximizers, 
aggressive in the market place and towards competitors, and 
"[c]orporate law provides a check on corporate behavior in the 
same way that criminal and civil law provides checks on individ-
ual behavior."59 
Cohen asserts that just as current corporate law tracks the 
liberal view of the individual, feminist critiques of corporate law 
ought to draw from feminist critiques of the liberal view of the 
individual. Just as feminist jurisprudence criticizes the liberal 
view of man for not recognizing the social element of individual 
behavior, corporate law similarly fails to recognize the social 
component of the corporation in its role in society. Social con-
cern, she says, should be the primary focus of a feminist examina-
tion of corporate law. Her premise is that given the "enormous 
collective power" of the corporate entity, the legal justification 
for the corporate form must be "the advancement of social good 
as well as the enhancement of ... profit."60 "A feminist theory 
of corporations would . . . be a theory of corporate social 
responsibility. "61 
The concern Cohen then raises is how to render a corpora-
tion socially responsible.62 Scholars writing from other jurispru-
58. [d. at 22-23. For an expansive analysis of the "masculine" liberal view, see 
generally West, supra note 5. 
59. Cohen, supra note 48, at 23. 
60. [d. at 23. 
61. [d. at 24. 
62. Cohen notes that the issue of corporate social responsibility does not arise 
for the first time with the application of feminist principles; it is not even a new 
query stemming from current critics of the legal economic system. See id. at 12. 
Concern regarding the corporation's role as a socially responsible entity has surfaced 
repeatedly throughout the history of legal and economic debates on the proper defi-
nition of a corporation. Cohen observes that not only have scholars such as Adolf 
Berle, Gardiner Means, and E. Merrick Dodd expressed great concern in the 1930s 
for the need to impose a corporate regard for public welfare, but even the great 
entrepreneur, Henry Ford himself, had to defend in court his view of corporate so-
cial conscience. See id. at 12-15; see also Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 
(Mich. 1919) (articulating Ford's arguments that the corporation's success came with 
a responsibility to use its profits to employ more men and build up their lives, as 
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dential perspectives who find the corporation's social obligation 
to extend beyond its level of productivity typically feel baffled as 
to how to motivate corporate social sensibilities.63 Cohen states, 
"[i]t is here that feminist theory can make its greatest contribu-
tion to the discourse."64 Drawing on aspects of relational and 
radical models of feminism, Cohen suggests quashing the separa-
tion between private and public spheres,65 and emphasizes the 
need to articulate and focus on how people are connected to one 
another.66 
To achieve that end, Cohen draws on the work of others.67 
She argues that those individuals ruling the corporation should 
participate directly in the consequences of the corporation's ac-
tions rather than merely relieving its burden through monetary 
dispensation. This personalized experience might induce the 
managers to create an environment in which the feminist ethic of 
care could develop at the corporation's core.68 Cohen notes that 
recommendations to create that empathic connection are the 
threads that run through the work of other feminist writers in the 
opposed to distributing those profits to shareholders in excess of "normal" 
dividends). 
63. See Cohen, supra note 48, at 17. Debates over corporate social responsibil-
ity have led to the American Law Institute's fifteen-year study on the proper role of 
corporate governance and to its publication of PRINCIPLES OF BUSINESS GOVERN-
ANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN 1992. One of the goals of the treatise 
was to establish principles that take into account both laissez-faire and social value 
concerns. See id. at 117 n.l13 (citing Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Foreword to PRINCI-
PLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS at x (Pro-
posed Final Draft 1992)). 
As further evidence of the struggle over how to inject social responsibility into 
the corporate model, Cohen notes that although Professor Christopher Stone con-
cludes that corporate morality should be defined by personal morality, he is at a loss 
as to how to imbue the corporation with that moral sense. See id. at 19-21 (citing 
Christopher D. Stone, Corporate Social Responsibility: What It Might Mean, If It 
Were Really to Matter, 71 IOWA L. REV. 557, 559-60 (1986)). 
64. ld. at 21. 
65. For other authors who discuss this typical feminist approach, see infra note 
67. 
66. See Cohen, supra note 48, at 21. 
67. JUDY WAJCMAN, FEMINISM CONFRONTS TECHNOLOGY (1991); Bender, 
supra note 42; Marion Crain, Images of Power in Labor Law: A Feminist Decon-
struction, 33 B.C.L. REV. 481 (1992); Gabaldon, supra note 42; Helen B. Holmes, 
Reproductive Technologies: The Birth of a Women-Centered Analysis, in THE Cus-
TOM-MADE CHILD? WOMEN-CENTERED PERSPECTIVES 1 (Helen B. Holmes et al. 
eds., 1981); Lahey & Salter, supra note 9; Gillian Lester, Toward the Feminization of 
Collective Bargaining Law, 36 MCGILL L.J. 1181 (1991). 
68. See Cohen, supra note 48, at 34. 
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business area.69 Cohen offers some interesting suggestions of her 
own to induce the ethic of care in corporations.70 
Cohen's work suggests a three-prong approach for feminist 
scholarship to affect business law: a method of analysis, an estab-
lishment of policy goals, and recommendations for the type of 
actions that implement those goals. Her method of analysis is to 
extend the feminist jurisprudence criticisms of the law of the in-
dividual to the law of corporations. Drawing on feminist juris-
prudence in general and focusing on the feminist ethic of care in 
particular leads her to the policy goal of rendering corporations 
socially responsible beyond issues of economic productivity. Co-
hen then suggests a strategy for imbuing the corporation with 
that sense of social responsibility by requiring individuals respon-
sible for corporate conduct to be personally involved in re-
dressing the conduct's consequences. 
Though Cohen offers a concrete strategy for feminist theory 
to have a positive impact on the social and legal treatment of 
corporate matters, the extent to which her analysis is and is not 
gendered is not that clear. Certainly her focus on the ethic of 
care, social responsibility, and collaborative approaches emerges 
from the gendered critiques of the patriarchy system. So in one 
69. For example, Cohen believes that Theresa Gabaldon's suggestion - limit-
ing shareholder's limited liability to encourage shareholders to take a more active 
role in reviewing corporate managers' decisions - moves in the right direction, be-
cause the shareholder would presumably bring to bear a greater sense of personal 
responsibility to corporate actions. See id. at 25-26 (discussing Theresa Gabaldon, 
The Lemonade Stand: Feminist and Other Reflections on the Limited Liability of 
Corporate Shareholders, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1387 (1992)). Lahey and Salter's sugges-
tions of more collective and cooperative organizations within the enterprise to allow 
connectedness and feminist values to emerge supports Cohen's perspective on how 
to bring moral responsibility to the corporate climate. See id. at 27 (discussing Kath-
leen A. Lahey & Sarah W. Salter, Corporate Law in Legal Theory and Legal Schol-
arship: From Classicism to Feminism, 23 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 543 (1985)). Finally, 
Leslie Bender's assertion that compensation beyond monetary damages by making 
those who were responsible for the corporate decisions that caused the harm have a 
nondelegable duty of caring for the victims "would bridge the gap between personal 
and political action" is completely consistent with the strategy Cohen advocates. Id. 
at 29 (discussing Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)Torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, 
Mass Torts, Power, and Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE L.J. 848 (1990)). See also infra 
text accompanying notes 132-58, 111-31. 
70. One is to give shareholders the right to criticize management for their fail-
ure to be concerned for societal interests. A second more intriguing idea is to mod-
ify the business judgment rule, the standard by which directors' conduct is judged. 
One modification would be to impose on directors the duty to be aware of the social 
consequences of their decisions. Another would have the business judgment rule 
serve to protect directors if they take an action that is adverse to the interests of the 
shareholders but is in the interest of the public good. 
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sense, Cohen's analysis can be viewed as anchored in gendered 
approaches. On the other hand, the specific behavioral changes 
she suggests - involving corporations with the victims of their 
harm, imbuing shareholders and management with a personal 
sense of responsibility, and revamping typical adversarial busi-
ness situations into co-operative ones - are not generalizations 
of women's issues. They are not generalized from specific wo-
men's concerns such as equality of pay and opportunity, health 
benefits, and child care. Cohen's policy concerns are more tran-
scendently about human concerns, questions that affect both men 
and women. Thus her work can be seen as having one foot in a 
gendered analysis and one foot beyond it. 
Paetzold's and Cohen's articles represent the first forays to-
wards a general theory of feminist analysis of business law, build-
ing on the foundation laid ten years earlier by Lahey and Salter. 
Each foray focuses on a different dimension of feminist thought: 
one on the allocation of power, the other on the ethic of care. 
E. Evaluating the Evaluations of an Economy's Success 
The next two articles do not address how feminist theory can 
affect business law specifically. They comment instead on the 
Western view of the economic environment, that is, what the pre-
vailing perception is of the economy and how to measure its per-
formance. Women and the Global Economic Order: A Feminist 
Perspective by Shelley Wright71 and The Lessons of Comparable 
Worth: A Feminist Vision of Law and Economic Theory by 
Jeanne M. Dennis72 focus on selected aspects of current eco-
nomic analyses that the authors feel need to be changed or at 
least modified by feminist understanding. 
Since businesses operate in the economic environment, and 
business law is designed to enhance business functioning, how 
one assesses the economic environment will determine how one 
evaluates the success of business law and, moreover, how one 
defines business law's goals. Both of these articles examine dif-
ferent aspects of evaluating the economic environment and the 
issues that feminist concerns would raise about those evaluations 
and their implications. 
71. Shelley Wright, Women and the Global Economic Order: A Feminist Per-
spective, 10 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'y 861 (1995). 
72. Jeanne M. Dennis, The Lessons of Comparable Worth: A Feminist Vision of 
Law and Economic Theory, 4 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1993). 
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Shelly Wright's article, Women and the Global Economic 
Order: A Feminist Perspective,73 critiques the prevailing analyses 
of developing economies through a liberal feminist perspective 
while drawing on aspects of cultural feminism. Wright criticizes 
the "Western" notion of economic rights for failing to include as 
fundamental the right of all human beings to a standard of living 
that provides sufficient food, shelter, and medical care. This 
truncated vision has three causes. One cause is the exclusion 
from consideration the experiences of women to whom, in devel-
oping countries, concerns for family life necessities are often rel-
egated. Denying women's economic reality permits analysts to 
remain unconscious of the dire consequences of insufficient stan-
dards of living.74 The second cause is the Western treatment of 
economic rights, along with social and cultural rights, as secon-
dary in importance and subsidiary to the primacy of political 
freedom. Finally, when considering economic rights, the Western 
perspective focuses on the right to access capital, to employ labor 
at the lowest wage and to operate freely in the marketplace.75 
To counter the Western view, Wright draws on the feminist 
analysis of destructive dichotomies. The separation between eco-
nomic and political rights is equivalent to separating public and 
private spheres. Just as the latter need to be reintegrated to pre-
vent exploitation and oppression of the family by the workplace, 
so is the reintegration of economic and political rights necessary 
to overcome the impoverishment of the poorer strata of society. 
Assessing the availability of political rights without a concomi-
73. Wright, supra note 71. 
74. See id. at 867-73. Wright points out how women are in fact more oppressed 
than what figures tell us about low income people and that the negative effect of 
Western development on low income individuals impacts more significantly on low 
income women than on the population as a whole. She observes that the current 
measure of economic well-being does not recognize the work that women do as 
"work" because it is not wage-earning work. Consequently, analyses understate the 
degree of negative impact on women. Furthermore, she notes that even though 
there are international bodies that espouse progressive standards consistent with 
feminist values, those standards' failure to recognize how women are peculiarly op-
pressed will prevent the application of those standards from providing women with 
rights comparable to men. 
75. See id. at 873-74. By making economic rights a second class concern, 
Wright shows that this facilitates the Western approach to exploit low income wo-
men even more so than others. Economic cutbacks typically occur in areas such as 
education, health care and social assistance, the burden of which is borne by women, 
because the responsibility usually falls to them to provide these essentials in the 
home. See id. at 882. Thus policy makers are in fact relying on women's unpaid 
labor to make up for reductions in public spending when attempting to reduce a 
nation's debt. 
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tant evaluation of economic rights tends to ignore the true ineq-
uities of living.76 Thus a redefinition of economic rights and a 
reintegration of those rights in parity with political rights is what 
feminist scholarship should call for. 
Though Wright focuses primarily on specific needs of wo-
men, she offers a theoretical critique of the prevailing analytic 
framework for evaluating economic success in general. Eco-
nomic rights concern all human beings, not only women. Though 
Wright's analysis is highly gendered, she nevertheless lays a foun-
dation for a feminist approach for evaluating economic well-be-
ing and, by implication, business law goals. 
Jeanne Dennis, in Lessons of Comparable Worth,77 also 
tackles the notion of economic rights but this time for more ad-
vanced industrial economies. Dennis defines deindustrialization 
(i.e., corporate down-sizing) as a shift in economic circumstances 
from when a head of household earns "decent wages and good 
benefits" to circumstances in which people have little economic 
security.78 Using the technique of feminist narrative, Dennis re-
lays the stories of two laid-off workforce women and their eco-
nomic hardships, severe frustrations, and the great fear they have 
and will continue to endure. She thus conveys the real life horror 
of layoffs due to deindustrialization.79 These stories create a 
feminist law and economics motive to address the deindustrial-
ization problem. 
Feminist law and economics offers an alternative to the in-
herent cruelty of the prevailing mainstream neoclassical law and 
economic characterization that rationalizes economic conditions 
in the abstract and "objectively" considers downsizing as an indi-
cation of being "at the center of one of the great, exciting mo-
ments in mankind's economic history."8o A feminist law and 
economics analysis recognizes that law shapes economic power, 
76. For reasons stated in earlier footnotes, those inequities impact women more 
heavily. 
77. Dennis, supra note 72. 
78. Dennis' definition contrasts with those that emphasize a shift in production. 
She gives as examples the MIT Dictionary of Modern Economics' definition which is 
a shift in Gross Domestic Product (a measure of a nation's annual output) towards 
services (and away from goods), and Bluestone and Harrison's definition which 
views de industrialization as a disinvestment in "productive capacity." See id. at 2 
(citing THE MIT DICfIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 100 (David Pearce ed., 3d 
ed. 1983); BARRY BLUESTONE & BENNETT HARRISON, THE DEINDUSTRIALIZATION 
OF AMERICA 6 (1982». 
79. See id. at 30-31. 
80. Id. at 32 (quoting Robert L. Bartley, editor of the Wall Street Journal). 
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that the evaluation of the economic well-being of a society 
should be the distribution of income, and that a measure of an 
economically stable economy is one which maximizes the 
number of individuals who can earn a "decent wage." In con-
trast, neoclassical law and economics views law as merely serving 
to facilitate the economic efficiency of the market and insists that 
an economy should be evaluated by its aggregated national 
wealth. As a result, neoclassical analysis concludes that the mea-
sure of a stable economy is its rate of growth while ignoring any 
notice of the number of poor or the standard of living among the 
many.81 
Neoclassical law and economics views the market as efficient 
and values only certain end results of the market economy, that 
is, an increase in aggregate output and advancement of economic 
growth. Dennis argues that neoclassical theory therefore offers 
no solutions to deindustrialization. Because feminist law and ec-
onomics has different goals, those of equitable economic distri-
bution and maximizing the number of people earning a living 
wage, it can suggest policy alternatives. Feminist law and eco-
nomics can focus on the excluded voice, a primary technique 
used in feminist analysis. In the case of deindustrialization, the 
excluded voice consists of the workers for whom deindustrializa-
tion has been a disaster, rather than the shareholders or corpo-
rate management for whom deindustrialization has been 
profitable.82 
Dennis' use of feminist analysis tackles a decidedly 
nonfeminist issue: corporate downsizing. She ascertains the 
existence of an excluded voice. She uses narrative technique to 
convey the horrors experienced by that excluded voice, creates a 
theoretical framework, or at least guidelines for goals principled 
upon the feminist ethic of care (economic rights to include the 
right to earn a decent wage), and then makes a policy recommen-
dation in pursuit of those goals. In the process, she points to the 
inadequacy of mainstream theory to address these issues and 
contrasts the goals of the mainstream approach with what she 
thinks should be the goals of a feminist law and economics 
critique. 
Though Dennis' analysis is motivated by the story of two 
women victimized by corporate downsizing, these stories are not 
81. See id. at 28-29. 
82. !d. at 35. 
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peculiar to women. These stories could be told equally of men 
suffering comparable losses. And though she does critique the 
mainstream approach as being one of dominance, her feminist 
theoretical framework, however much in opposition to the main-
stream, is not anchored in a counterpunch to patriarchy. Dennis 
offers principles based on equitable economic distribution that 
are independent of whatever the mainstream analysis might con-
tain. Thus, Dennis' work demonstrates that feminist analysis can 
expand beyond the more typical feminist concerns of patriarchy 
and therefore can address business law issues that are not pre-
mised on patriarchal structures. 
IV. THE SYNERGISM OF FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE AND LAW 
AND ECONOMICS: A DEFINITION OF JUSTICE IN 
RIGHTS DISTRIBUTION 
A close examination of China's Market Economy: A Semio-
sis of Cross Boundary Discourse Between Law and Economics 
and Feminist Jurisprudence, by Sharon Hom and Robin Paul 
Malloy,S3 enables us to glean a new role for feminist analysis in 
business law, one yet to be discussed or explored. That role 
emerges from feminist jurisprudence's interaction with law and 
economics and it is feminist jurisprudence's capacity to define 
what constitutes a just (or fair) distribution of rights. Feminist 
jurisprudence, however, cannot only define just rights distribu-
tions per se, but can do so within the context of efficiency where 
efficiency is measured by law and economic standards. 
Efficient distributions, as well as efficiency in general, is a 
subject long viewed as solely within the concerns of law and eco-
nomics jurisprudence. Policy recommendations arising from law 
and economic analysis, however, have been the subject of contro-
versy for many decades. As will be demonstrated, feminist juris-
prudence is able to address those concerns and still remain within 
the parameters of law and economics' efficiency goals. 
China's Market Economy is an interchange between a femi-
nist theorist and a law and economic analyst about the emerging 
market economy in China. Their discussion not only reflects 
both a law and economics and feminist jurisprudence evaluation 
of the success of a newly-forming market economy, but also dem-
83. Sharon K. Hom & Robin Paul Malloy, China's Market Economy; A Semio-
sis of Cross Boundary Discourse Between Law and Economics and Feminist Juris-
prudence, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 815 (1994). 
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onstrates the influence that one jurisprudence can have on 
another. 
An analysis of Hom and Malloy's exchange presents an in-
teresting interplay of a number of ironic contrasts occurring at 
the same time. These contrasts serve to show another universal 
nongendered role for feminist thought, one that is different from 
allocations of power. To fully appreciate these contrasts, it is im-
portant to keep in mind that unlike much of feminist analysis, 
law and economics jurisprudence mainly extols the advantages of 
the free market system and favors the capitalist ideology. Typi-
cally its analysts seek to extend law and economic (or "free mar-
ket") analysis to contexts beyond the marketplace such as 
criminal justice and civil procedure,84 viewing the unfettered 
market approach as the most efficient means to maximize social 
welfare in almost any context. Over time law and economics has 
had wide-ranging influence in law.85 As indicated in the discus-
sion of Jeanne Dennis' work above,86 however, law and econom-
ics analysis also has been criticized for its patriarchal orientation 
and its failure to incorporate human values and moral goals. It 
appears to substitute efficiency criteria for social policy. 
Not all law and economics scholars though, apply law and 
economic reasoning as a pure market efficiency analysis. The 
pure market efficiency analysis is typically viewed as mainstream 
law and economics and usually labeled the "Chicago School" ap-
proach. An increasing number of law and economics scholars 
are nevertheless very much concerned with the presence of 
value-choices implicitly or explicitly in law and economic analy-
sis. Though this is a minority voice, it is a growing one.87 
On its face, China's Market Economy consists of an ex-
change of letters between a feminist theorist, Hom, and a law and 
economic analyst, Malloy, that occurred while they were both 
teaching at the China Center for American Law Study in Shang-
84. See, e.g., Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560 (7th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (apply-
ing Learned Hand's cost/benefit formula to justify a warrantless search); White Lake 
Improvement Ass'n v. City of Whitehall, 177 N.W.2d 473 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970) 
(applying Coase's transactions cost analysis to determine when to invoke the pri-
mary jurisdiction doctrine). 
85. See, e.g., Gregory S. Crespi, Teaching the New Law and Economics, 25 U. 
ToL. L. REV. 713 (1994). 
86. See supra text accompanying notes 77-82. 
87. See, e.g., LAW AND ECONOMICS: NEW & CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES (Robin 
Paul Malloy & Christopher K. Braun eds., 1995). 
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hai during two consecutive summers. The subject of their dis-
course is the emerging market economy in China. 
What in fact Hom and Malloy present is a commentary on 
the nature of the market economy that is emerging in the largest 
nonmarket (that is, centrally planned), anticapitalistic (that is, 
Marxist, communist, or socialist) nation in the world. Hom is a 
Chinese-American woman born in Hong Kong and raised in the 
heartland of market capitalism, the United States. Her sensibili-
ties are those of a feminist critical of the treatment of women in 
China, a nation not based on Western-styled democracy or patri-
archy.88 The other commentator, Malloy, a male born and raised 
in the United States, is a law and economics scholar who is a 
noted voice in the growing law and economics perspective that 
does indeed pay attention to the moral values in Western-styled 
free markets.89 
The interchange is between a feminist, critical of China in 
her concern for human political rights, and a law and economics 
scholar critical of Western market analysis in his concern for 
value goals in law and economic reasoning. Both evaluate the 
emerging private market in the fundamentally communist polit-
ical economy. One might think, given both writers' concern for 
moral values, that there would be considerable confluence in 
their assessment of the circumstances in China. But as will be 
seen, quite the opposite is true. 
An underlying question in this dialogue is whether feminist 
analysis and law and economic reasoning have anything to offer 
each other. To the extent that feminist reasoning extends beyond 
women's issues, there is not only the question of whether femi-
nism can analyze allocations of power beyond patriarchal alloca-
tions of power, but also the question of whether feminist analysis 
can encompass more than allocations of power per se. In particu-
lar, one may also ask whether feminist analysis can inform other 
analyses and also be informed by other analyses, as opposed to 
merely critiquing and being critiqued by them. This is a particu-
larly interesting query for feminist thought, since one of its major 
88. See Sharon K. Hom, Does Real Estate Syndication Provide a Viable Financ-
ing Strategy for Low Income Housing? 50 BROOK. L. REV. 913, 914 (1984); Sharon 
K. Hom, Female Infanticide In China: The Human Rights Specter and Thoughts To-
wards (An)Other Vision, 3 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 249, 254-61 (1992). 
89. See Robin Paul Malloy, A New Law and Economics, in Law and Econom-
ics: New and Critical Perspectives 1, 21-27 (Robin Paul Malloy & Christopher K. 
Braun eds., 1995). 
1999] FEMINISM AND THE LAW OF BUSINESS 71 
contributions to social understanding is to signify the importance 
of operating from a collaborative perspective rather than an ad-
versarial one. It is also an interesting query for law and econom-
ics because of the increasing concern for moral values. 
Regardless, an enlightening synthesis between powerful reason-
ing tools can be transcendent of the tools themselves, and Hom 
and Malloy's semiotic exchange represents a first effort to ex-
plore such territory. 
As one begins to read the letters, what is most immediately 
striking, given Malloy's concerns for values expressed in market 
structure, is his focus instead on the imperfections of the Chinese 
market itself. Initially he is struck by the manner in which the 
government imposes a peculiar dual Chinese currency - one for 
foreigners and one for locals - that forces foreigners to pay 
more for goods and services in China than the Chinese do.90 
Thus the Chinese small businessmen have an incentive to sell 
their goods and services to foreigners over locals in order to ob-
tain the foreigners' more valuable Chinese currency. Further-
more, when the Chinese businessmen give change in a 
transaction with a foreigner, they usually give it (in a somewhat 
disingenuous manner) in the less valuable c~rrency for locals.91 
Malloy is offended by this blatant exploitation of foreigners. 
He resents being rendered into a "commodity" and being seen 
only as a supply of the more valuable nonlocal Chinese cur-
rency.92 His first reaction, however, is not to bemoan the com-
modification of individuals that a free market method of 
allocating goods and services stimulates, as a feminist might ar-
gue and as Hom indeed does. Nor does he examine - initially, 
at least - the value implications of the particular market struc-
ture in China that he is witnessing, as might be expected of a law 
and economics scholar concerned with value choices. Instead, he 
focuses on the "defects" of the Chinese market as measured by 
Chicago-styled law and economics; he scrutinizes the "impedi-
90. See Hom & Malloy, supra note 83, at 822. On Malloy's first trip, he finds 
that China requires foreigners to exchange their own currency for a Chinese cur-
rency that is marked non local and different from the local Chinese currency. 
Though within the local Chinese markets for goods and services, the nonlocal cur-
rency is used interchangeably with the local currency, banks will exchange the non-
local currency for more foreign currency than they will for the local currency. See id. 
at 821-23. 
91. China abandoned this two-tiered currency policy by the time Malloy and 
Hom returned the next year. See id. at 835. 
92. [d. at 822-23. 
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ments" to a Chicago-idealized conception of an unfettered mar-
ket.93 Such impediments would be, for example, differentiated 
currency that is not based on differences in value. Chinese cur-
rency has no greater intrinsic value merely because it is held by a 
foreigner - unless the government imposes an artificial 
difference. 
Noting other market-constraining aspects that he finds 
troubling, Malloy observes that there are "signs of controlled and 
limited choice" throughout Chinese markets that he feels counter 
the full functioning of a market economy. "Merit and innovation 
must rise above status and personal relations." Characterizing 
these restraints as walls, Malloy writes, "[w]alls are barriers to 
markets"94 and concludes that because of these walls China is 
unlikely to develop a free market.95 
Hom, on the other hand, does bemoan the commodification 
of individuals that seems to be taking place as a result of the 
emerging market mentality. She recalls with some dismay when 
her own five-year-old son so thoroughly integrated into the Bei-
jing community that he was treated as a local, and requested that 
the tooth fairy leave his reward in "U. S. Dollars."96 She notes 
the public/private dichotomy, a dichotomy that feminists typi-
cally deplore, that is being created in China as a result of the 
creation of private markets in a publicly-controlled state. She 
wonders how the privatization process might in fact be exploited 
by those individuals in choice public positions who can then 
channel state-owned resources into the private hands of family 
and friends. 97 
Malloy expresses his belief that free markets and the com-
petitive process itself produce an environment for the advance-
ment of human rights. Free markets, he argues, empower people 
to pursue their creative interests and advance social progress.98 
Hom's concern is whether the introduction of the market will 
cause human rights to be lost. Since human rights have no eco-
nomic value, they are not sought after by those economic actors 
who are primarily concerned with and successful at accumulating 
93. See, e.g., id. at 831 (discussing on how property rights generated the feudal 
economy that was transcended by the development of contract). 
94. [d. at 831. 
95. [d. at 838. 
96. [d. at 825. 
97. See id. at 824-25. 
98. See id. at 837. 
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economic wealth. Both Hom and Malloy are concerned with the 
private/public dichotomy but for different reasons. Hom is con-
cerned that the creation of the private/public dichotomy arising 
from the privatization of the market place will cause social values 
to become invisible.99 To the contrary, Malloy's concern is that 
the division between market and state will not be strong enough. 
A healthy division creates a healthy competitive tension between 
public and private sectors that will serve to check and balance 
each other so that neither one will become too powerful. This 
explains Malloy's concern that at home in the United States 
there is undue emphasis on an unfettered private market and his 
concern in China that there is too much state interference in the 
market. lOo 
Hom and Malloy's point of disagreement with respect to 
China's privatization efforts appears to hinge on the connection 
between the private market and the role of the state in preserv-
ing human values. One author fears too much interference, and 
the other fears inadequate support from the state for human val-
ues. Both seem to agree that, regardless of their differences as to 
whether ensurance of human rights shall arise, from within the 
market structure or from without it, China itself does not support 
human rights as both authors define it. Malloy, however, be-
lieves that the Chinese government's interference in the market 
prevents those human rights from emerging,lOl whereas Hom be-
lieves that the Chinese government is merely not interested in 
supporting the brand of human rights in which the authors are 
concerned. In her view, the separation between public and pri-
vate aspects brought on by the emerging private market as well 
as the market approach itself makes human rights matters even 
worse.102 
There is, however, a common ground between the two writ-
ers, subtle and unspoken. Its elements are expressed intermit-
tently throughout the semiotic discourse, which is perhaps the 
point of semiotic discourse. There is a venue of commonality be-
tween a law and economics scholar concerned for moral values in 
the market place and a feminist scholar concerned that the 
99. See id. at 844-45. 
100. See id. at 837-39. For further explication of Malloy's arguments about the 
need for competitive tension between the public and private spheres, see Robin Paul 
Malloy, PLANNING FOR SERFDOM: LEGAL ECONOMIC DISCOURSE AND DOWNTOWN 
DEVELOPMENT 30-37 (1991). 
101. See Hom & Malloy, supra note 83, at 839. 
102. See id. at 844. 
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means and methods of the political economy support human 
rights. That commonality lies in the region of rights distribution. 
Rights distribution, whether property, economic, or political 
rights, is the foundation from which any market proceeds. One 
of the key flaws of the original Chicago school approach in its 
quest for purity of market was to fail to recognize that every mar-
ket is, in a sense, efficient, regardless of its "impediments," which 
in fact all markets have. This is true whether it be societal laws 
that define economic and property rights or a more primitive en-
vironment in which "might makes right." In other words, every 
market moves to an efficient outcome in the legal structure in 
which it is embedded. Outcomes of different efficient markets 
are very likely to vary, depending on each market's "impedi-
ments." The most important point is that there are many out-
comes that are efficient. The Chicago view, as it originally was 
put forth (and fairly strong remnants of which remain), treated 
economic outcomes as a group arguing that there was only one 
unique efficient outcome - the "wealth-maximizing" outcome. 
Furthermore, proponents asserted that not only would this effi-
cient outcome be the one that would maximize social welfare, but 
it would be achieved only if policy-makers would follow the Chi-
cago adherents' advice and "remove" all those impediments (as 
they defined them) to the unique efficient market.103 
Contrary to the initial Chicago perspective,104 there are in 
fact a multiplicity of efficient outcomes. Which efficient outcome 
arises is premised on the initial distribution of rights. That is, the 
fundamental distribution of economic (including property) rights 
among the populace, determines the scope of the possible eco-
nomic outcomes when looking at the market mechanism for allo-
cating resources, goods, and services. Similarly, the distribution 
of political rights determines the nature of political freedom 
when taking the market approach to political outcomes. lOS Of 
103. For the most classic representation of this view, see generally R.H. Coase, 
The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
104. I use the term "initial" Chicago perspective because over time as various 
scholars have attacked with great credibility aspects of the Chicago analysis, the Chi-
cago view has been modified considerably. Though the direction of modification 
may not be readily apparent, it is clear upon closer examination that even the Chi-
cago perspective is moving closer to the recognition of the multiplicity of efficient 
outcomes within the framework of initial rights distribution that appears in the dis-
cussion following this footnote. 
105. For an extensive discussion of the multiplicity of outcomes and the signifi-
cance of the initial distribution of rights on market outcomes, see Barbara White, 
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course, in reality, economic and political rights are intermingled 
as are their relative impacts on outcomes. Though the process of 
the market, as people trade on their rights, may change the rela-
tive positions of individuals, the possible changes are constrained 
by the initial rights that the individuals possess. This limits what 
people can or cannot trade, whether it be goods and services or, 
for lack of a better term, political favors. The problem grappled 
with by so many law and economics scholars concerned with 
value choices is that this distribution of rights is often unstated, 
often unseen, and often changed unknowingly by policy pro-
nouncements. Often, policies focus on immediate end goals 
without realizing that they also alter the long run rights-redistri-
bution as well. 
Rights distribution is the flip side of the marketplace; one 
does not exist without the other. Changes in rights distribution 
changes what funnels through the market process and what 
comes out the other side. What resonates throughout both Hom 
and Malloy's letters are concerns that actually relate to the distri-
bution of rights. 
Thus, the dual Chinese currency system that so jarred Mal-
loy is actually the equivalent to a decision regarding the distribu-
tion of certain resources on the Chinese government's part that is 
different from the more common mode in other developing 
countries. Many countries impose artificial exchange rates to ex-
tract more money from foreigners than would occur if the market 
place set the rate of exchange and reflected the true demand by 
locals for foreign currency and ultimately foreign goods. Typi-
cally, however, it is the nation's central bank that reaps the re-
wards. The financial benefits usually end in some fashion in the 
state's hands to pursue policies. The Chinese method presents an 
alternative distribution of those financial gains. The two-tier cur-
rency allows that profit to move directly to the citizens of China, 
at least those involved in the local markets in which foreigners 
make their purchases. Those citizens of China who accumulate 
the most are those who work the hardest and who possess the 
greatest entrepreneurial skill, an outcome to which a free-market 
analyst could hardly object. 
Of course Malloy is quite correct that the artificially inflated 
exchange rate is an impediment to a free market that is maximiz-
Coase and the Courts: Economics for the Common Man, 72 IOWA L. REV. 577, 
595-99,603-11 (1987). 
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ing global social welfare from the exchange of goods. This is true 
of any trade barrier. Viewing China, however, as a developing 
country that is pursuing an exchange rate policy common among 
developing countries, the particular form the policy takes has a 
certain egalitarian cache, at least for the Chinese citizens. The 
exploitative aspects of the artificial exchange feel very uncom-
fortable, however, and almost insulting when the impact is exper-
ienced personally as with Malloy. Clearly what is from one view 
an impediment to free markets is from another view a decision 
on economic distribution. What Malloy was experiencing first 
hand was a redistribution of assets - money - away from his 
hands to those of the local Chinese traders. 
The question that is repeatedly raised throughout the au-
thors' discussion is whether this Chinese market fosters a kind of 
commodification of human beings that is alien to a notion of 
human rights and political freedoms. Malloy's concern for 
"walls" that will impede human rights is seen by Hom as repre-
senting efforts to preserve, negotiate, and shatter a multiplicity of 
Chinese values.106 But the walls, these negotiations over a multi-
plicity of Chinese values, are really discussions about the distri-
bution of rights. Discussions about values, political rights, 
human rights, and economic rights are in reality a discussion 
about how those rights are being distributed. Just as Dennis' dis-
cussion of the economic right of individuals to earn a living wage 
as compared with the economic right of an individual to employ 
another at the lowest wage possible is a discussion about the dis-
tribution of economic rights between those who employ and 
those who earn, so is the discussion about the role of the state in 
the market place a discussion about the distribution of rights, all 
rights, in a political economy. 
It is the state and its attendant social structure that deter-
mines and upholds the distribution of rights in society through its 
laws and traditions. We cannot rely on the market place to do 
this. The market place has nothing to say about what the initial 
distribution of rights is or ought to be. It merely processes peo-
ple through their decisions and with their rights distribution to 
some outcome, the scope of which is limited by the initial rights 
distribution. To leave the initial rights distribution unexamined is 
in fact to make a choice for the distribution as it is, observed or 
unobserved; the problem is then that the choice is unknown. 
106. Hom & Malloy, supra note 83, at 833. 
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This is implicit in Hom's assertion in her last letter critiquing 
certain aspects of Malloy's free-market arguments: 
I do not understand where your implicit ... faith ... in 
the potential of the market[] ... derives from. . .. [N]othing 
suggests that democracy and human freedom will be VAL-
UED by the individuals who may take advantage of the op-
portunities presented for building a new and different social 
order. I think your argument . . . conflates an institutional 
choice [i.e., the marketplace] for implementing value/goal 
choices (e.g., human rights, individual liberty and freedom) 
with the value/choices themselves.107 
Though Malloy maintains that the market place is where 
freedom will arise, he does acknowledge the role of values in the 
market place. He comments on the repeated observation by Chi-
nese participants in his program that America is "rich, free, and 
violent."108 They want China to be as rich but without America's 
"immorality and violence." Some question whether Americans 
could consider themselves free when they fear encountering 
crime so much. Noting his own sense of safety in China at any-
time, day or night, Malloy concludes that every society has its 
problems. Though Malloy states that he believes the U.S. crime 
problems stem from its ideological drift from free market values, 
he also states that "too many of us don't want to talk about val-
ues, morality, responsibility, commitment, and community[,] nec-
essary prerequisites to a free market. These are 'messy' subjects. 
Let's just talk about getting rich - that is easy discourse."109 In 
that criticism, Malloy is indicating that markets are premised on 
values. And as discussed above, values concern the distribution 
of rights. 
In the dialogue between Hom and Malloy, each approaches 
the other through a common concern for values. And within that 
common concern lies the opening of a possibility of what feminist 
jurisprudence and law and economics scholarship might offer 
each other. That opening consists of a discussion of the distribu-
tion of rights. As already discussed, economic analysis can eluci-
date what rights distributions exist in various market and non-
market economies, what rights distributions might be possible, 
and certain aspects of some of the consequences of different 
rights distributions. But law and economics as economic analysis 
cannot comment on which rights distributions should be chosen. 
107. /d. at 845. 
108. [d. at 840. 
109. [d. at 840-41(emphasis added). 
78 UCLA WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 10:39 
That is a discussion of values, a discussion that properly belongs 
to another jurisprudence. That jurisprudence can very well be 
feminist jurisprudence.11o 
V. To THE ApPLICATIONS 
[W]e must make our legal system consistent with our chosen 
personal values and priorities. We err if we maintain two sets 
of values - one for our personal relationships and one for our 
activities in the business world.111 
Two other articles, Leslie Bender's article, Feminist 
(Re)Torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts, Power 
and Responsibility, 112 and Theresa Gabaldon's The Lemonade 
Stand: Feminist and Other Reflections on the Limited Liability of 
Corporate Shareholders 113 focus on applying feminist analysis to 
specific business law issues. They are among the first to do so 
and their work is ground-breaking.114 
Both authors apply feminist analysis to address particular 
social ills caused by corporate conduct that mainstream analysis 
has yet to adequately resolve. The attention is on the harms cor-
porate activity inflicts on third parties. Both Bender and 
Gabaldon focus on the corporate decision-making process and its 
underlying ethics (or lack thereof) and conclude that it is the root 
cause of problematic third party harms. Each author suggests 
that revising the corporate legal environment in a manner that 
will imbue the corporate decision-making process with the femi-
nist ethic of care will resolve many of these issues. Each author, 
however, takes a markedly different approach as to how to 
achieve that end. 
A. For Example: The Mass Tort Crisis 
In her article, Feminist (Re)Torts: Thoughts on the Liability 
Crisis, Mass Torts, Power and Responsibility, 115 Bender applies 
110. Deborah Rhode already notes that the common goal of feminist critical the-
ories is "to challenge existing distributions of power." Rhode, supra note 2, at 619. 
Though Rhode is addressing distributions of power between men and women, there 
is no reason why such analysis could not be applied to distribution of economic and 
political power in general. 
111. Bender, supra note 42, at 853. 
112. Bender, supra note 42. 
113. Gabaldon, supra note 42. 
114. Since this survey was first written, a number of other articles applying femi-
nist analysis to specific business law issues have been published. They are included 
in the bibliography in Section VIII of this Essay. 
115. Bender, supra note 42. 
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feminist analysis to question both the allocations of 'power and 
ethical values to the growing controversy surrounding mass torts. 
She disputes the contention that the mass tort crisis is the result 
of greedy plaintiffs and unreasonably plaintiff-sympathetic juries. 
She argues instead that mass torts (and their current legal and 
economic conundrums) arise from imbalances in our social sys-
tem's distribution of power over risk-creating activities and the 
value choices thus evoked. The problem begins with the corpo-
ration's power to decide unilaterally on beneficial (and therefore 
profitable) activities that also may put some members of the pub-
lic at risk of harm. Those decisions are made without the scru-
tiny of public debate or support by social consent,116 The crisis 
evolves because in a court of law the now-injured plaintiffs are 
often severely disadvantaged for presenting their claim, both in 
terms of financial resources and access to information, particu-
larly when they face a large corporate defendant. The crisis so-
lidifies, if indeed the corporation is found liable, by virtue of the 
solely monetary nature of remedy the court awards the plaintiffs. 
Monetary compensation does not provide the injured with the 
full emotional and social support they now need. Furthermore, 
monetary compensation' absolves corporate decision-makers 
themselves from any sense of a deeper level of responsibility be-
yond a pecuniary one, thereby making it easier for them to un-
dertake such risk-imposing decisions again. Thus monetary 
penalties for the corporation undermine the deterrent effect lia-
bility judgments are believed to have on future conduct,117 Hav-
ing demonstrated that legally permissible decisions risking torts 
are skewed in favor of corporate financial interests118 and do not 
reflect broader ethical values that society might choose, Bender 
then applies feminist approaches to recommend policy changes. 
She argues that corporate risk-taking activity be put to public de-
bate rather than remain a private undertaking, implying that the 
public's willingness to undertake risk for progress may be differ-
ent from the corporation's and reflect different value choices that 
ought to be respected.119 Presumably, Bender believes that 
116. See id. at 859-60. 
117. See id. at 860. 
118. See id. at 861 n.35. 
119. Bender notes that the size of some liability awards may reflect jury mem-
bers' frustration with the corporation's unilateral imposition of risks on other peo-
ple's lives. Certainly, activities pursued only upon a priori public debate and 
knowing public consent would provide some measure of relief from such frustration. 
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those public values will coincide more with the feminist ethic of 
care than those implied by market-driven choices. 
Bender also advocates leveling the playing field in the court-
room, particularly when a large powerful corporation is involved. 
Using the feminist values of equal access to information and 
power (in this case, financial resources), she recommends a pol-
icy that shifts the burden of proof from the injured plaintiffs to 
the corporate defendant. She suggests that upon a limited show-
ing by plaintiffs that an injury has indeed occurred and is related 
to the corporation's activities, shifting the burden of proof then 
to the corporation is far more likely to be fair.12° Her principle is 
to place the burden of proof on the party most able to demon-
strate their position.121 Eschewing the more traditional standard 
of "neutral, objective" judicial noninterference (a liberal ap-
proach that is typically viewed by feminists as preserving a patri-
archal hierarchy), Bender argues that only equal empowerment 
of the parties through judicial intervention ensures true justice.122 
Finally, she recommends (and is the first in feminist litera-
ture to do S0123) that those individuals involved in the corporate 
decisions that led to the plaintiffs' harms should be directly in-
volved in some fashion in the care of the injured. They should 
not be allowed to escape experiencing the consequences of their 
actions by dismissing the event from their venue merely because 
monetary disbursements bring legal closure. If corporate deci-
sion-makers become more conscious of the impact of their deci-
sions on others, the empathic nature of the experience may cause 
them to pause and consider larger human ramifications than 
merely the corporate bottom line when making similar decisions 
on risky conduct in the future. Through the aforementioned 
means, Bender hopes to imbue the corporate hierarchy with the 
feminist ethic of care. 
We can use Bender's observations on the current power dy-
namics to demonstrate how the mass tort crisis feeds on itself. 
120. See Bender, supra note 42, at 880. 
121. Bender's proposition is an interesting contrast to Coase's recommendations 
that disputes over property rights be resolved by allocating the rights to the party 
most willing to pay for it. 
122. Bender does note at the end of her article that in fact the "neutral, objec-
tive" approach has its merits and that what would be desirable would be to draw on 
the best of both "equal justice" and the feminist ethic of care and equality of em-
powerment. Bender, supra note 42, at 909. 
123. It is from Bender'S article that Paetzold gets her ideas of direct connection. 
See supra text accompanying notes 49-56. 
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Since the corporation makes its decisions unfettered by public 
opinion and according to its ultimate goal of financial profits, this 
combination easily leads the corporation to choose its actions on 
a cost-benefit basis.124 Cost-benefit analysis allows the corpora-
tion to measure risks and gains of a particular venture in purely 
monetary terms, which may in fact understate the true cost to 
society.125 Thus, if a venture is risky, the corporation will evalu-
ate the likely financial gains against current and possible future 
costs to the corporation alone. The probability that the injured 
will prevail in a lawsuit and that monetary awards might then 
occur, not the possible number of individuals harmed, affect the 
calculation of potential costs to the corporation. In the process 
of weighing financial benefits against possible costs, the corpora-
tion decides what risk of harm to which it exposes the public. 
That decision is driven solely by the corporation's financial bot-
tom line.126 
Thus the mass tort crisis has as its seeds in the weighing and 
balancing of public risk against public benefit measured not by 
the public's willingness to make such trade-offs but by the corpo-
ration's private risks and benefits to its balance sheet. The crisis 
continues to evolve because the one measure of public harm that 
the corporation is forced to consider, the risk of lawsuits, is 
skewed down in impact as a result of the legal obstacles facing 
plaintiffs in court. Embedded in this legal and business structure 
are rapidly advancing technologies, each with their own concomi-
tant benefits and harms, along with the capacity to affect increas-
124. Bender herself notes that the monetization of damages lends the corporate 
decision-making process to cost-benefit analysis. See Bender, supra note 42, at 
875-76. 
125. For a discussion of how cost-benefit analysis can be expanded to encompass 
values beyond monetary ones, see Barbara Ann White, Risk-Utility Analysis and the 
Learned Hand Formula: A Hand that Helps or a Hand That Hides?, 32 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 77, 115-24 (1990). 
126. Of course there are those who argue that this self-interest profit motive 
leads to decisions that actually maximize social welfare. But there are a significant 
number of criticisms of that line of reasoning. For a general discussion of these 
issues, see generally HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMIC, AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST 
LAW 1-39 (1985), EDWIN MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY and ApPLICA-
TIONS 259-330 (8th ed. 1994). For a discussion demonstrating that although the cost-
benefit process itself is separate from any particular value choice that a user may 
apply, the results of the analysis are dependant on the user's value, see White, supra 
note 125, at 111-115. That article also demonstrates that cost-benefit analytic pro-
cess can incorporate more than merely monetary assessments and, in that context, 
addresses many of the same policy issues that Bender raises here in the feminist 
jurisprudence context. 
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ingly larger sectors of the public. Under such circumstances the 
explosion of the mass tort crisis is all but inevitable. 
The inadequacy of more mainstream suggestions to the mass 
tort crisis evidences less than satisfactory solutions. Currently, 
most mainstream recommendations advocate placing a financial 
cap on damages or suggest that implicated firms seek refuge in 
bankruptcy reorganization. These proposals do not solve the cri-
sis but merely limit further consequences of torts on the 
tortfeasor. Coupling these "solutions" with tort victims' difficul-
ties in achieving redress in court,127 it is not difficult to envision 
the incidence of mass torts spiraling upwards, with the number of 
victims (and uncompensated victims in particular) rising with it. 
Bender's approach for finding solutions to the mass tort cri-
sis is to shift the focus away from cutting victims off from com-
pensation and towards defining the origins of the mass tort. By 
looking for the source of the crisis rather than attempting to curb 
acknowledgment of the consequences, Bender opens the pos-
sibilities of circumventing the incidence of mass torts at its 
genesis. 
We can draw lessons for applying feminist technique to busi-
ness law problems by examining Bender'S methods of arriving at 
her proposals. Bender's primary analytic premise is based on 
compassion for the "other," in this case the hapless victim of cor-
porate malfeasance. Looking at the experience through the eyes 
of the victim (the "excluded voice"), directs Bender's inquiry to 
the tort's origin and uncovers how the engine of mass tort dy-
namics perpetuates the crisis that it creates. For developing pol-
icy proposals to effectuate change, Bender in effect engages two 
feminist principles: one an analysis of power and the other the 
feminist ethic of care. 
Bender's observation that the victims in most cases had no 
power of informed choice leads her to recognize implicitly the 
asymmetry of the risk-taking decision process. Those who create 
the risk - the corporate decision-makers - are not those who 
truly bear the risk - the customers or neighbors to the corpora-
tion's production process. Her observation of the suffering and 
frustration of the victims during the often drawn-out legal pro-
cess that mayor may not result in legal rectification leads her to 
recognize the asymmetry of legal resources to litigate a claim.128 
127. Bender, supra note 42, at 882-83. 
128. See id. at 876 n.n. 
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Both observations recognize an asymmetry in the allocation of 
power that excludes the "other" - the victims. This leads 
Bender to recommend policies to correct the imbalance. She 
proposes "opening up" risk-taking discussions to public debate 
and realigning burdens of proof to create equality in courtroom 
battles. 
In addition to the feminist power analysis, Bender also in-
vokes the feminist ethic of care to guide policy recommendations 
as well. She notes that the decision-making process fosters a 
compassionate indifference of corporate leaders to the victims of 
the corporate actions. That indifference affects several stages of 
the development of the mass tort: the corporate decision to un-
dergo the risky behavior on the basis of its financial bottom line, 
its strategy to avoid or at least delay responsibility for the tort in 
the legal proceedings, and the dismissal (in the tortfeasor's mind) 
of the consequences of its actions once the corporation pays 
monetary damages.129 
Bender suggests strategies for undoing that indifference. 
The goal is to bring forth in corporate decision-makers a sense of 
"connectedness," empathic responsiveness to the needs of 
others, and a recognition of the importance of all members of 
society, in particular, those the corporation injures. This cogni-
tion is necessary to imbue the corporation with the ethic of care 
and to discourage those decisions that lead to the mass tort crisis. 
Bender therefore recommends policies to counteract the corpo-
rate lack of the ethic of care: public debate before risky corpo-
rate undertakings, corporate payment of victims' injury expenses 
during the course of the trial, and requiring corporate decision-
makers to become directly involved in the victims' recoveries af-
ter the event.130 Each of these policy recommendations is 
designed to infuse the situation with the ethic of care, either by 
imposing it from outside the corporate walls (through public de-
bate or paying for victims' injury expenses during trial) or by en-
couraging its development from within (through corporate 
decision-makers direct involvement in victims' recoveries). 
By applying the feminist ethic of care and the feminist ana-
lytic approach to power to discover the underpinnings of the 
mass torts crisis, Bender has gone further than other contempo-
rary writers to show the effectiveness of feminist jurisprudence. 
129. See id. at 897-99 (discussing the lack of corporate responsibility for injuries 
sustained by consumers). 
130. See id. 
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She has shown that feminist jurisprudence can constructively 
evaluate an issue that has no discern able gender aspects to it. 
Clearly, mass torts is not particularly a woman's issue. More in-
terestingly, it is not even a gendered issue, or even a group disen-
franchisement issue in the broadest sense of that concept. As 
already demonstrated earlier in this Essay,l3l the principles of 
feminist analysis can be applied not only to women's issues but to 
issues of any disenfranchised group, for example, minorities or 
certain workers. But the victims of mass torts do not belong to 
any particular excluded group; mass torts can strike anyone re-
gardless of their socio-economic status, gender, race, or ethnicity. 
The socio-economic make-up of the victims of one mass tort may 
share no characteristics with those victims of another mass tort. 
Thus Bender has shown that feminist jurisprudence is an analysis 
sufficiently powerful that its applicability and insightfulness is 
likely to cover questions from the full spectrum of law. 
B. For Example: Limited Liability 
In her article, The Lemonade Stand: Feminist and Other Re-
flections on the Limited Liability of Corporate Shareholders, 132 
Gabaldon also focuses on the conscience, or lack thereof, in the 
corporate decision-making process. She attacks, however, the 
role that limited liability plays in corporate decisions that induce 
third party risks. She questions the legal and economic ratio-
nales for shielding owners of corporate enterprises with the lim-
ited liability veil. She is skeptical of limited liability'S supposed 
efficaciousness because it enhances even further the separation 
that already exists between enterprise owners and responsibility 
for corporate business actions.133 She posits two alternatives for 
reducing the incidence of corporate induced third party harms. 
One is a characterization of an enterprise in an ideal feminist 
world and the other is a set of pragmatic suggestions to impose 
on enterprise structures to imbue them with a greater sense of 
the ethic of care. 
The current corporate form is designed to induce individuals 
to invest in larger, riskier enterprises by offering them limited 
liability shields from the debts of the corporation. In exchange 
for limited liability protection, states require that shareholders 
131. See supra text accompanying notes 5-13. 
132. Gabaldon, supra note 42. 
133. See id. at 1391-92. 
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surrender direct control of the corporation and elect instead indi-
viduals to a Board of Directors with the fiduciary responsibility 
of running the enterprise.134 It is this separation that gives rise to 
Gabaldon's primary objection to the corporate form. Engaging 
in or endorsing activities for one's own benefit that may simulta-
neously impose harm on others is antithetical to feminist sensibil-
ities. Gabaldon observes that many corporate activities, in the 
search for profits on behalf of shareholders, often do exactly that: 
impose risks on third parties.135 This violates feminist principles 
of connectedness, community, and responsiveness to the needs of 
others. Limited liability only compounds this ethical violation by 
then relieving the shareholder of personal liability for the nega-
tive consequences that occur to others.136 
Gabaldon questions two primary justifications for the role of 
limited liability.137 One is a traditional legal argument. Justice 
requires that individuals be held liable only for harms for which 
they are culpable, and culpability requires some measure of con-
trol over the offensive conduct. Since for legal (and pragmatic) 
reasons shareholders do not have direct control over corporate 
conduct, holding them personally liable goes beyond the bounds 
of justice. 
The second justification for limited liability is an economic 
or "law and economics" one:138 a policy of limited liability is effi-
cient and economically beneficial for society. Limited liability, it 
is argued, is necessary to encourage people to invest in corporate 
enterprises that may otherwise result in exposure to significant 
financial losses. Individuals will not invest in an enterprise if 
they risk more than they want to or if the liability exposure may 
consume their entire personal assets if the corporation fails to 
134. The most notable exceptions are the following: if the corporation's by-laws 
require shareholder approval for specific issues, the shareholder is elected to the 
Board, or as in most states, closely-held corporations (i.e., corporations in which all 
outstanding shares are owned by a few individuals, such as friends who go into busi-
ness together or family members) that are allowed by state statute or common law 
to dispense with many of the formalities of a ruling Board of Directors. Even when 
the last is not possible formally, closely-held corporations may in fact have most or 
all shareholders on the Board and in that way be directly involved in the corporate 
decision-making process. 
But, presumably, for Gabaldon's purposes here, she has in mind the large cor-
porations in which the number of shareholders are diffuse and many. 
135. See Gabaldon, supra note 42, at 1400. 
136. See id. at 1430. 
137. See id. at 1403-04. 
138. /d. 
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cover its debts.139 Without limited liability, shareholders will 
monitor corporate decisions more intently to protect their per-
sonal assets. This is an inefficient use of time and resources par-
ticularly if a board of directors must respond to hundreds, 
perhaps thousands, of shareholders, each with different opinions 
as to proper corporate conduct. Furthermore, limited liability al-
lows the corporation to undertake riskier projects by effectively 
reducing the losses if the projects fail without mitigating the ben-
efits if they succeed. Experimental research and development in-
creases the rate of technological advance to the benefit of society 
overall. 
To counter these arguments, Gabaldon first suggests an ideal 
world based on feminist values which would eliminate the need 
for limited liability. First, extensive community support would be 
in place, assuring everyone of their essentials for living life in the 
way of home, hearth, and healthcare, regardless of their circum-
stances. This would reduce a potential investor's fear of risking 
investment and becoming impoverished. Second, though 
Gabaldon agrees that eliminating limited liability would increase 
shareholder monitoring, she sees advantages to the result. Cor-
porate enterprises would tend to be smaller, allowing for more 
integration between home and work, enabling the corporate 
structure to be more responsive to individual and community 
needs. Shareholders would be more likely to bring to the corpo-
rate table their own sensibilities, which may include a more per-
sonal ethic (consistent with the feminist ethic of care), rather 
than just an eye looking solely towards the expansion of corpo-
rate profits at any COSt.140 Hopefully the effect would be to lower 
the likelihood of decisions that impose third party risks. The 
standard Gabaldon would like to see applied is one of "the ut-
most care."141 Furthermore, increased shareholder involvement 
should allay the concerns of jurists with regard to shareholder 
culpability without control. In a community consistent with femi-
nist values, society's well-being should be so greatly enhanced in 
the absence of limited liability policies, that any reduction in the 
139. See id. at 1408. 
140. See id. at 1436. 
141. Gabaldon uses as an example the question of whether we the readers would, 
as shareholders, approve the exploding Pinto gas tanks. See id. at 1431. 
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rate of technological advance that might result would be well 
worth the trade-off.142 
We do not live in a society premised on those values, how-
ever, and realistically, limited liability's elimination is unlikely. 
In the alternative, Gabaldon suggests we aggressively pursue pol-
icies that respond to the reality that individuals are increasingly 
put at risk because of corporate activities. To stem that tide, she 
focuses on reforms that empower shareholders to get more in-
volved in corporate decision-making and require corporations to 
have adequate insurance to support those who fall victim to cor-
porate harm. Her advocacy of greater shareholder involvement 
is, for reasons stated earlier, the hope that shareholders will bring 
a stronger personal ethic to corporate decisions. Towards that 
end she recommends reforms that facilitate communication 
among shareholders143 and enlarge shareholder rights to include 
proposals in management proxy solicitations.144 Greater investor 
involvement would weaken the basis for limited liability policies 
in the future. 
Despite problems inherent in any insurance environment, 
Gabaldon also sees a number of benefits in requiring adequate 
insurance.145 First, defining what constitutes adequate insurance 
could steer the measure away from a profits and loss calculation 
142. Gabaldon would like to see research focused on improving health and the 
environment. [d. at 1438. 
143. In the laws of many states and under federal statutes, communications 
among shareholders are significantly constrained. Such communications are often 
treated as solicitations and those may run afoul of both federal and state mandatory 
disclosure requirements under both federal and state securities regulations. The ef-
forts to conform to those regulations in the way of proper filings of information are 
substantial and failure to do so can invoke significant penalties and potential crimi-
nal liabilities. Such circumstances have significant chilling effects on shareholder 
efforts to operate in any concerted fashion. 
144. Typically, the management is required to hold annual shareholder meetings 
that allow for the elections for members of the Board of Directors and votes on 
other matters that require shareholder approval. In large publicly-held corpora-
tions, it is unlikely that many of the shareholders will be able to attend the meetings. 
Since a shareholder meeting requires a quorum, management will typically mail out 
proxy solicitations with candidates for the Board of Directors and the various propo-
sal to be put before the shareholder. These proxy solicitations allow the sharehold-
ers to vote on the issues and then return them to management. Certain laws require 
management to include in these proxy solicitation proposals that a shareholder may 
wish to have other shareholders vote on issues that relate to corporate conduct. The 
permissible subject matters of these shareholder proposals, however, are currently 
severely constrained, preventing shareholders from having significant impact. 
145. For example, the unavailability or expense for certain types of torts insur-
ance, the immorality of measuring lives in terms of dollars, and moral hazard 
problems. See Gabaldon, supra note 42, at 1449-50. 
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to more of a community standards value. This could be achieved 
by establishing a community review panel to define and apply a 
standard of reasonableness.146 Holding management personally 
accountable for failure to secure adequate insurance would moti-
vate them to seek outside review which could easily be made by 
the community panel. This would serve several ends. One, it 
would bring an evaluation of the adequacy of insurance a priori 
as opposed to post hoc when the injuries have already occurred 
and there may not be adequate insurance or any other source of 
funds to alleviate the damages. Second, it would raise the com-
munity's awareness as to what kinds of risks the corporation is 
contemplating and provide an opportunity for some form of pub-
lic debate.147 Third, the managers themselves would be forced to 
contend with the seriousness of the implications of potential 
harm to actual individuals instead of turning a blind eye to that 
reality and looking solely at the dollars and cents calculations of 
measuring the risk.148 Finally, the introduction of mandatory ad-
equate insurance would bring a new monitor to corporate activi-
ties: the insurance companies. In contrast to the corporate client, 
insurance companies face their own financial bottom line. Insur-
ance companies are more likely to seek reductions in incidence 
and magnitude of harms than the corporations they insure whose 
activities are buffeted by limited liability and insurance. 
Gabaldon hopes this will lead to the standard of care she favors, 
one of "utmost care. "149 
Thus, Gabaldon, like Bender before her, uses feminist analy-
sis to uncover a source for the contentious issue of corporate-
induced third party harms. She too feels that the problem arises 
from the corporate decision-making process and its focus on 
monetary evaluations of benefits and costs. In an effort to bring 
146. See id. at 1450. 
147. See id. at 1453. 
148. See id. at 1454. "[What appears to management] to be no more than an 
offsetting loss on a financial statement may look quite different to a community 
volunteer. Simply reminding management of that fact may have a moderating influ-
ence. Thus, an executive might think more than once before announcing to an insur-
ance panel, 'We know that our infant seat restraints will fail at X rate, so we will 
carry Y amount of insurance.'" Id. 
Gabaldon also discusses the political problems that can arise with any review 
committee, from overzealous community advocates imposing unreasonably high in-
surance requirements, to a committee that has been "captured" by the corporate 
community and becomes unreasonably deferential, as well as a number of other im-
plementation problems. Id. at 1451-54. 
149. Id. at 1452-53. 
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the broader perspective of the feminist ethic of care into these 
decisions, she focuses on one particularly noteworthy stumbling 
block to that end: limited liability for shareholders. To counter 
the impact, she proposes two approaches. One is to demonstrate 
an economic world in which limited liability would not be 
needed, and that world is premised on the feminist principles of 
the ethic of care, connectedness to the other, and being respon-
sive to the other's needs. The second is a more pragmatic ap-
proach, offering suggestions to undo the negative effects of 
limited liability. Those suggestions are practical ones. Some en-
courage greater shareholder involvement in the corporate deci-
sion-making process and some ensure adequate funds to care for 
the needs of the victims of corporate harms. Both proposals 
serve the possibility of imbuing corporate decisions with a 
greater ethic of care. Increased shareholder involvement follows 
the feminist principle of reintegrating dichotomies and, as a re-
sult, has the possibility of bringing different shareholders' ethics 
into the corporate decision-making process. Requirements for 
adequate insurance follow the feminist principle of obliterating 
distinctions between public and private spheres. These require-
ments lead to greater community review of intended corporate 
activities and greater conscious awareness of the corporate deci-
sion-makers themselves of the more human dimensions of their 
decisions. 
Like Bender's analysis, Gabaldon uses the feminist ap-
proach to uncover an important aspect of a business law issue 
and to recommend remedies. Once again, Gabaldon's work 
demonstrates the power of feminist jurisprudence to address is-
sues that have no particular correlation with women's concerns 
or those of disenfranchised groups in general. Moreover, her 
work is not concerned with patriarchal hierarchies. Her use of 
feminist analysis addresses a problem of concern to everyone. 
VI. FEMINIST VALUES, LAW AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, AND 
CORPORATE DECISIONS: REFLECTING THE 
PUBLIC'S CHOICE 
Both Bender and Gabaldon are concerned with the appar-
ent indifference to human harm built into the corporate decision-
making process. They see that indifference arising from an em-
pathic disconnection between the decision-makers and the 
human consequences of corporate activities that result from the 
decision-making process itself. Though each author recommends 
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different policies, their common goal is to inject feminist ethical 
values of care to override the decision-making process' outcome. 
Underlying their analysis, however, is a fundamental distrust of 
the corporate decision-making process itself: the cost-benefit an-
alytic technique. 15o 
Feminist analysis explains why both Bender and Gabaldon 
are troubled by the separation of the beneficiary (that is, the 
shareholder or manager) from the consequences of actions taken 
on his or her behalf or direction. It fosters an atmosphere in 
which inculcating third party risks are made with less reservation. 
One of feminism's significant contributions is the recognition 
that in the name of "objectivity," current social structures en-
courage their participants to think of others in the abstract rather 
than as individual sensate human beings. In the case of cost-ben-
efit analysis, for example, this can translate human harm into ab-
stract numbers or statistics. In such an environment, 
psychologically it is far easier to undertake courses of action that 
can inflict great suffering among individuals when the decision is 
thought of in abstract terms.151 
One might argue that the emotional or psychological dimen-
sion embodies those ethical values of "concern for others" that 
are lost if an abstract approach, such as a purely monetary evalu-
ation, is adopted. Feminists indicate that different decisions will 
be made when full cognition of the consequences are involved. 
Full cognition triggers a moral dimension in the decision-maker 
that he or she will bring to bear in the evaluation process, pre-
sumably one that will more properly conform to society's values 
and choices. Purely abstract reasoning, on the other hand, allows 
decision-makers to close their eyes to the horrors their actions 
may create for those who are impacted. As a result, except for 
the limited risk of lawsuits,152 the full impact of the potential 
150. "My critique of mass tort law primarily focuses on its over reliance on an 
economic, cost-based analysis of liability and its acquiescence in traditional legal 
understanding of corporations and their uses of power." Bender, supra note 42, at 
851. "[Economics'] assumptions about rational self-interest as a laudable motivat-
ing force represent a world view that is jarringly inconsistent with that of ... femi-
nism." Gabaldon, supra note 42, at 1426. 
151. This is not unlike experiences in the Vietnam War, when members of the 
armed services found it easier to drop bombs from jets onto radar blips of villages 
labeled as strategic targets than to walk into the village and, while face to face, kill 
old men, young boys, women, and children. 
152. For a more detailed discussion of this concept, see supra text accompanying 
notes 111-31. The faultiness of our legal system to adequately account for corporate 
torts is eminently exemplified by the history of tobacco litigation. The current con-
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harm does not enter the corporate decision because the decision-
maker incorporates no personal sense of identification or respon-
sibility for the impact on the victims. The decisions, as a result, 
weigh the positive effect on corporate profits more heavily. 
Though neither Bender nor Gabaldon address how the sepa-
ration between beneficial and negative consequences affects spe-
cifically the decision-making process itself, they do observe that 
not bearing responsibility for the full consequences of actions is 
antithetical to feminist values. Thus their objections to the cur-
rent corporate structure is that lack of culpability encourages a 
lack of responsibility. 
The question must be asked then: What about the corporate 
decision-making process itself? Is it so morally bankrupt that the 
only remedy is to bring in moral values that override its choices? 
This inquiry causes us to further examine the manner of corpo-
rate decisions. 
As economists have long shown, there is no question that 
corporate decisions are based on a cost-benefit reasoning, 
whether explicitly or implicitly; if the benefits exceed the costs, 
the venture is typically deemed worthy. As demonstrated earlier 
in the discussion of Bender's articie,153 when the only values 
taken into consideration are monetary ones, and if the monetary 
measures do not capture the full ramifications of the costs (or 
perhaps even the benefits) to members of society, often the cor-
poration's decisions seem to be heartless. 
Does this imply, however, that the cost-benefit decision-
making process itself is the problem? Or is it the adequacy of the 
values entering into the cost-benefit "equation"? As a society, 
we would be hard pressed to deny that we all engage in cost-
benefit analyses on a continuous and daily basis. It is not hard to 
recognize that some level of risk is always present in any en-
deavor. People make choices all the time to undertake risks, par-
ticularly because the benefits of the activity outweigh its risk of 
negative consequences. People make this choice the moment 
they walk out the door and face the risks of the everyday world: 
drive a car and risk an accident, bring electricity into the home 
and risk electrocution. One could not move in any dimension of 
troversy surrounding the potential tobacco companies' settlement, in which the dol-
lar amounts are truly staggering, are recognized as being only marginally painful to 
the tobacco companies' future profits on the dissemination of a drug that is now 
finally openly acknowledged as highly addictive and singularly life-curtailing. 
153. See supra text accompanying notes 111-31. 
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life if one was not willing to accept a certain level of risk. Per-
haps many of us avoid the paralysis that acknowledging such 
risks would cause by adopting some denial state thinking: "This 
won't happen to me." Nevertheless, we undertake various kinds 
and degrees of risks all the time and we do so because we want 
the benefits those activities bring along with their risks. Thus 
there is no question that weighing and balancing is not only an 
acceptable but a necessary decision-making mode for everyone, 
not just corporations alone. 
The moral pangs seem to arise when there is a separation of 
those who decide the activity and its level of risk, from those who 
end up bearing the risk. The examples of risk-taking cited in the 
previous paragraph might feel more comfortable than corporate 
conduct because they appear to be choices made by individuals 
to impose risks on themselves and their loved ones. The corpo-
rate decision to the contrary clearly imposes risks on third par-
ties.1S4 What seems to offend is that the corporation is making 
profits by producing something that has a level of risk that falls 
on others. ISS 
There is no question, however, that society prefers to have 
the benefits of industrial productivity: automobiles, airplanes, 
and advances in medical technology. Even Gabaldon acknowl-
edges that we do not want to go without them to absolutely avoid 
the risk of harm. Society has in effect made the decision to ac-
cept that risk, even the risk of death, not knowing upon whom 
the harm will befall.1s6 The true questions we face are the fol-
154. This seems to be of particular concern to Gabaldon. See, e.g., Gabaldon, 
supra note 42, at 1430. For example, the corporation who manufactures airplanes, 
determining the acceptable level of safety, and therefore risk, to impose on passen-
gers (with the help of governmental agencies) may find its own executives, even 
those who had made the safety level decisions, killed in a plane crash due to the 
accepted levels of risk built into some design factor. 
155. In point of fact, even when one is deciding to put oneself and one's loved 
ones at risk to undertake a risky endeavor one inevitably imposes risks on others. 
For example, choosing to drive a car puts the driver and others around him at risk. 
Bringing electricity into the home creates the risk of fire there and to one's 
neighbors. 
156. John Rawls has posited the socially optimal distribution of risk (and bene-
fits) in his book, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). In it he argues that people should 
select their own favored state of risk and benefits without knowing where on the 
spectrum of well-being they will personally fall when the state is realized. Thus, 
people will be choosing what their preferred trade-off between risks and benefits is. 
The collective social choice on this trade-off, Rawls argues, is society's optimal risk-
benefit choice, reflecting society's collective value on risk relative to benefits. See 
generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY of JUSTICE (1971). This is setting aside the more. 
practical and extremely legitimate issues of whether justice and the economy have 
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lowing: given that risk of harm is unavoidable, what is the "ac-
ceptable" level of risk, what are considered reasonable efforts to 
avoid harm, and how will the injured be compensated when harm 
inevitably occurs? 
Once we ask such questions, we are automatically in the 
realm of cost-benefit analysis. Just as one can make a personal 
assessment as to what level of risk one wishes to absorb, society 
can and must make such an assessment with regard to activities 
that affect general well-being. Issues of military protection, med-
ical advances, and environmental concerns all involve questions 
of risk of injury and death. They are also all considerations that 
must be addressed at the societal level. Industrial productivity is 
merely one of the areas in which decisions must be made regard-
ing what levels of risk the society as a whole wishes to bear for 
deriving the benefits that taking industrial risks will bring. 
When such cost-benefit decisions are made at a societal 
level, the nature of the parameters does not change. If there is a 
risk of harm, when a large number of people partake of it, some 
will suffer losses. Nevertheless, if society concludes that the ben-
efits outweigh the harms, its decision-makers will elect to tolerate 
the harms confined to a portion of the population to reap the 
benefits. And in some instances that may even mean a decision 
to tolerate the risk of death. Society already makes such deci-
sions in tolerating the manufacture and sale of automobiles. 
It is evident, however, in this entire discussion of cost-bene-
fit analysis, that there are at least two stages of decision-making. 
In addition to the weighing and balancing process itself, is the 
critical question of how to evaluate the costs and benefits. When 
an individual engages in the cost-benefit process, though the 
evaluation of the costs and benefits may be complex, the evalua-
tion nevertheless rests on the individual's private sense of values 
and morals. In contrast, when a society makes this determina-
tion, the evaluation process reaches an exponentially higher level 
of complexity for a whole host of reasons. Two reasons are the 
disparate range of values that different members of society hold, 
and the fact that those who benefit are not always those who 
bear the cost. Nevertheless, society must determine in some 
fashion what the value of the benefits to society truly are and 
how severe society considers the various costs. 
been structured so that the harm is more likely to fall on the less advantaged or less 
empowered in society. 
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A solution of maintaining a standard of "utmost care," as 
Gabaldon suggests, is not very effective for this question. Of 
course we would want all enterprise participants to take the ut-
most care not to inflict harm on others through the activities in 
which the enterprise engages. The implications of Gabaldon's 
analysis, however, are that there should never be any activity that 
knowingly may inflict harms on others. Given that nearly all in-
dustrial activities engage in a certain level of risk of harm and 
that this is known, such a standard suggested by Gabaldon would 
cause all productivity to stop. To the contrary, it is the increased 
level of knowledge that facilitates reducing risks to consumers 
that also facilitates knowing what the risk will be. Ironically, that 
knowledge is critical to ascertaining what level of risk we should 
tolerate. 
How to evaluate benefits and costs are questions that the 
law and economics movement, particularly the one out of Chi-
cago, has attempted to answer subject to much criticism. In addi-
tion to importing cost-benefit techniques from economics to 
apply to the weighing and balancing process in law, the law and 
economics movement as dominated by the Chicago School also 
has imported the economists' typical mode of evaluating costs 
and benefits. The measurement they recommend is using market 
prices. 
Those hostile to the law and economics movement usually 
criticize and reject the entire process of cost-benefit analysis. 
This is in large part because the resulting policy recommenda-
tions from the Chicago law and economics perspective so often 
seem to the critics as un varyingly unfair.157 A significant source 
of the controversy surrounding the Chicago School analysis, 
however, stems in fact from the market price methods the Chi-
cago School uses for evaluation. For reasons explained below, 
these are methods of evaluation to which feminists (as well as 
others) would rightly object. Though criticism of the Chicago 
School approach tends to focus on the decision methodology it-
self, that is the use of cost-benefit reasoning, it is the use of mar-
ket prices in making those weighing and balancing decisions that 
in fact is the real culprit. 
Market prices do not adequately measure the true cost to 
individuals and to society of the harms that are at risk of occur-
157. For a discussion of these concerns, see Gabaldon supra note 42, at 1429. 
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ring.1s8 Market prices merely reflect an aggregation of choices 
made by individuals when each is considering his or her pocket-
book and tastes alone. Because it measures people's willingness 
to spend on certain commodities and services, the preferences it 
reflects tends to be skewed in favor of the rich because they have 
more to spend. Because the choice of purchase made by an indi-
vidual reflects decisions concerning only him - or herself - the 
resulting market prices fail to consider larger social consequences 
of aggregative actions. The marketplace's failure to address a 
large range of social concerns has long been recognized. Individ-
ual and public safety, the environment, defense, research, and 
development are all often used to justify governmental regula-
tion, taxation, and expenditure so as to assure consumer confi-
dence, safeguard the public, and promote long term economic 
growth. 
With some reflection, it becomes obvious that market prices 
cannot serve as our sole measure of value to society of benefits 
and costs. There are dimensions beyond an individual's private 
willingness to pay for a good that must enter into the weighing 
and balancing decision-making process when considering activi-
ties that impact at a societal level. The question becomes then: 
"What are those added dimensions and how do we include them 
into the cost-benefit equation?" 
This suggests in part what is problematic with the corporate 
decision-making process as it is now structured. The corporate 
decision-making process by focusing solely on the corporate bot-
tom line essentially relies on market prices. Market prices deter-
mine the amount of revenues that the firm receives (that is, the 
selling prices of the firm's goods or services) and market prices 
determine the firm's costs (that is, wages and costs of other 
materials and services used). The corporation's use of market 
prices for its financial decisions are tempered only by the 
probability of lawsuits, the probability of losing and the likely 
payout if losing occurs, the effect of which, as Bender so ably 
demonstrates, does not capture the full measure of the cost of the 
harm created to others. The question with respect to the corpo-
158. This is of course a debatable issue among various schools of law and eco-
nomic thought as well as among economists themselves. Within economic circles, 
however, the flaws of using market prices to reflect accurately social values are 
pretty much well accepted now. It is still used nevertheless in practical applications 
of cost benefit analysis by economists primarily because of its convenience and the 
fact that it does measure to a large extent individual choice with regard to commod-
ity purchases. 
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rate decision-making process then is the same as the question for 
cost-benefit analysis in general. Given that the corporation 
ought not rely solely on the financial aspects when making its 
decisions, what other dimensions should they include and how 
should they incorporate them? 
It is this aspect of monetary evaluation used in the corporate 
decision-making process that is really at the heart of what 
Bender and Gabaldon, as feminist scholars, seek to address in 
the cost-benefit analysis evaluation dilemma. Viewing their pol-
icy suggestions in this light, it becomes clear that their recom-
mendations for change offer a means of social evaluation of costs 
and benefits that will hopefully include the extra dimensions of 
morals and values that eludes a purely monetary approach. 
Through their suggestions of a priori extra-corporate review of 
corporate decisions, they suggest a means to bring in a public 
sensibility of the relative values of the costs and benefits to soci-
ety of various corporate undertakings. Their suggestions of per-
sonal involvement of corporate enterprise participants will 
introduce the human conscience into the evaluation of the cost to 
others. This hopefully will bring to the corporate decision-mak-
ing process the subjective evaluation the decision-makers would 
apply in their own individual circumstances. 
Thus what Bender and Gabaldon provide are both a means 
and a measure to include those additional dimensions of human 
evaluation and care into the corporate decision-making process. 
As a result, they demonstrate another critical role that feminist 
jurisprudence can play in resolving business law issues: a means 
for addressing the ethical conundrums inherent in law and eco-
nomic analysis of risk, particularly as it manifests itself in law and 
economic reasoning of business law concerns. Just as feminist 
jurisprudence can interact with law and economics to define a 
just distribution of rights, as described in Section IV above, femi-
nist jurisprudence can advise a proper means for the social evalu-
ation of gains and that ought to enter into law and economics 
cost-benefit analysis. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
It is evident then that feminist analysis can address issues far 
broader than solely women's concerns. It is also clear that femi-
nist analysis is not limited to gender concerns, group disen-
franchisement, or analyses of patriarchal hierarchy and 
dominance. This Essay has demonstrated this in two ways. One 
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is through analyzing the works of feminist scholars addressing 
business law issues. That analysis shows that the principles of 
feminist reasoning - recognizing the excluded voice, the per-
spective of the other, dichotomization of social order into differ-
ent spheres - can be used to uncover core problems in business 
law that have nothing to do with traditional gender issues. Simi-
larly, analysis of those authors' articles shows that by using the 
techniques of narrative form, contextual analysis, and the reinte-
gration of separate spheres, one can dissect the nature of busi-
ness law quandaries. This Essay also shows how those authors 
invoke the fundamental principle of the feminist ethic of care in 
conjunction with promoting a sense of connectedness and collab-
oration among all members of society to form the basis for 
resolving many of the social conflicts that arise in the business 
law arena. Thus there cannot be any question whether the femi-
nist method is analytically equipped to address legal issues other 
than feminist concerns; clearly it already does. 
Equally intriguing, however, are the roles suggested by this 
Essay that feminist jurisprudence can play in interacting with an-
other jurisprudence that has had broad impact in the legal arena: 
the discipline of law and economics. This Essay's analyses 
demonstrate two important areas of interaction: the distribution 
of economic and political rights and the collective decision on 
social risk-taking. Though one feminist author asserts that law 
and economics and feminist jurisprudence have no common 
ground,159 the discussions on rights distribution and social risk-
taking in this Essay suggest otherwise. In fact, each discipline 
most probably can learn considerably from the other. Certainly 
in the areas of risk-taking and rights distribution, more can be 
learned from mutual investigation. Almost as certainly, there 
will be other areas in which law and economics and feminist ju-
risprudence will comment on each other. 
Feminist jurisprudence and law and economics seem in fact 
to meld together particularly well. Law and economics is a disci-
pline and discourse focused on moving from one socio-political 
scenario to another efficiently and for the maximum benefit of 
society. Feminist analysis is a discipline focused on evaluating 
what socio-political scenarios currently exist and what goals soci-
ety might like to achieve. The synergistic effect of the two disci-
159. See generally Gabaldon, supra note 42. 
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plines operating in concert augurs well for addressing significant 
socio-political concerns in the future. 
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